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Towards the Automation of Vulnerability Detection in Source Code
Hai Zhou LING
Software vulnerability detection, which involves security property specification and veri-
fication, is essential in assuring the software security. However, the process of vulnera-
bility detection is labor-intensive, time-consuming and error-prone if done manually. In
this thesis, we present a hybrid approach, which utilizes the power of static and dynamic
analysis for performing vulnerability detection in a systematic way. The key contributions
of this thesis are threefold. First, a vulnerability detection framework, which supports se-
curity property specification, potential vulnerability detection, and dynamic verification,
is proposed. Second, an investigation of test data generation for dynamic verification is
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Free and Open Source Software (FOSS) are programs whose licenses give users the free-
dom to run the programs for any purpose, to study and modify the programs, and to redis-
tribute copies of either the original or modified programs (without having to pay royalties to
previous developers) [94]. Today, more and more effort and attention are devoted to the de-
velopment of FOSS as the use of FOSS has risen to great prominence [3O]. FOSS is being
accepted as a viable alternative to commercial software. For example, since 2000, Netcraft
has been separately counting "active" web sites. In the April 2009 web server survey con-
ducted by Netcraft, among the 231,510,169 web sites, Apache, which is an open-source
web server, remains in the lead, as it has since 1996, with a total of over 106 million sites,
which counts for the 45.95% of the market share, followed by Microsoft-IIS with over
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67 million [20]. For cost-efficiency reason, more and more organizations, including gov-
ernment and military, have started to consider the deployment of FOSS applications [99].
In 2006, Forrester Research suggested to North American and European enterprises that
"firms should consider open source options for mission-critical applications" [55].
Software engineering methodologies have been relatively successful in producing large
software effectively, but it has not been so successful in producing secure software immune
to abuse and malicious attacks. This has been demonstrated recently by many headline
news about computer security attacks, spreading viruses, e-mail spams, and economic loss
due to these security breaches [92].
With the obvious growth and the importance of FOSS today, FOSS security has be-
come a very challenging concern for both industry professional and academician. Due to
different technologies and market factors, open-source software often carry various security
vulnerabilities, some of which can be very severe if exploited. To mitigate the problem, a
serious effort should be placed on open-source software vulnerability testing. The automa-
tion of such process is becoming a necessity, which will result in reducing development
costs and also improving the quality of the software under test. Among the techniques for
vulnerability detection, static analysis is powerful in detecting vulnerabilities. However,
static analysis techniques usually generate some amount of false positives. To reduce the
number of false positives, effort should also be made.
2
1.2 Objectives
In this thesis, the goal is to investigate the automation of open source software security
vulnerability detection with minimized number of false positives. To achieve this goal, it
is important to automate the process of test data generation, which is needed for dynamic
verification. Accordingly, the objectives of this thesis are illustrated as follows:
• Investigate the use of static analysis approach to identify risky set of vulnerabilities.
• Elaborate techniques that will generate test data to dynamically assess vulnerabilities.
1.3 Contributions
This thesis makes the following contributions to the development of an automatic and ex-
tensible solution for vulnerability detection:
• A framework for vulnerability detection that encompasses static analysis, dynamic
analysis, code instrumentation, and test data generation;
• An investigation of different approaches for test data generation. In Particularly, we
investigate the use of push-down model checking with program slicing, and hybrid
(static and dynamic) test data generation;
• An investigation of the reduction of security property verification to reachability.
The model-checking based static analysis technique used in this thesis is leveraged from
the research [88,98].
3
1.4 Organization of the Thesis
The thesis is organized as follows: in the following chapter, we briefly introduce tradi-
tional software testing, security testing, and test data generation. Chapter 3 describes our
approach for vulnerability detection and the system architecture. Chapter 4 explains the
concept of test data generation using Moped reachability checker with program slicing
technique. Chapter 5 presents a hybrid approach for test data generation. The integrated
system for test data generation and the experimental results are provided in Chapter 6.




This chapter briefly introduces traditional software testing that focuses on software qual-
ity, security testing that concerns software security, and different techniques for test data
generation.
2.1 Traditional Software Testing
Software testing is an empirical investigation conducted to provide stake holders with in-
formation about the quality of the product or service under test [68]. The main purpose
of software testing is to evaluate an attribute or capability of a program or system and
determine that it meets its required results [60]. Software testing is not only a very labor-
intensive but also expensive process. The software testing cost can account for 50% of
the total software development cost [78]. The traditional software testing usually includes
correctness testing, performance testing, and reliability testing.
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For the correctness testing, an oracle is needed to validate whether the code implemen-
tation follows intended design. The person that performs the test may or may not know the
inside details of the software under test. Accordingly, the correctness testing can be classi-
fied into two groups: white-box testing and black-box testing [82]. For black-box testing,
the testers do not have the inside view of the structure of the software. It is test data-driven.
The correctness testing is conducted by feeding test data to the software under test and
observe the output. Contrary to black-box testing, while-box testing requires access to the
source code. It also requires the generation of test cases to achieve statement coverage, and
branch coverage.
Performance is another important benchmark of software quality. The execution of
software should be performed in a finite time or finite resource. Performance testing is
used to determine the speed of a system under a particular workload. The performance of a
software can be evaluated in the aspects, such as resource usage, throughput, and stimulus-
response time [82].
Software reliability is defined as the probability of failure-free software operation for
a specified period of time in a specified environment [31]. Software reliability testing is
a process that conducts quantitative reliability assessments for the software under test in
terms of robustness and stress.
Traditional software testing concerns on the software quality, such as correctness, effi-
ciency, and stability. However, software that meets the traditional quality criteria might not
be secure. In recent years, since more and more vulnerabilities have been reported, software
security concern grows. To assess the software security, security testing is needed.
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2.2 Security Testing
Security testing is the process to verify that critical software protects data and maintains
functionality as intended. Due to the increase of software security concerns, security testing
has now become more and more important. Traditional software testing mainly focuses on
functional testing and quality assurance. Security testing is often fundamentally different
from traditional testing because it emphasizes what an application should not do, rather than
what it should do [49]. In this thesis, we mainly focus on the software security vulnerability
detection.
2.2.1 Vulnerabilities
The symptoms of security vulnerabilities are very different from those of traditional bugs
[95]. Security testing is primarily performed to verify a system's conformance to security
requirements (security properties) and to identify potential security flaws within the system.
Security vulnerabilities are the consequence of violating security properties. There are six
basic types of security properties [96]:
1. Confidentiality: ensuring that information is accessible only to those authorized to
have access;
2. Integrity: ensuring the information transmitted are not altered by others;
3. Authentication: verifying that someone is who they claim to be;
4. Authorization: granting or denying access to resources;
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5. Availability: assuring information and services will be ready for use when needed;
6. Non-repudiation: preventing the later denial that an action or communication hap-
pened.
The primary reason for software security testing is to identify potential vulnerabilities,
which violate the security properties. Security testing goes deeper than simple black-box
probing on the presentation layer and even beyond the functional testing of security appa-
ratus [74]. It relies on a combination of creativeness, expansive knowledge bases of best
practices.
There is a huge demand for security vulnerabilities testing. Figure 1 shows that the
number of software security vulnerabilities reported has increased a lot since 1995, accord-
ing to the CERT Statistics [4]. Up to the end of the third quarter of 2008, the total number
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Q Total vulnerabilities cataloged
Figure 1: CERT Statistics: Cataloged Vulnerabilities
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The cost could be huge once the vulnerabilities are exploited. For instance, in 2001 , the
Code Red and Code Red II viruses infected tens of thousands of systems running Microsoft
Windows NT and Windows 2000 server software, causing an estimated 2 billion in damages
[13]. In August 2007, the online job site Monster.com suffered a security breach that
reportedly resulted in the theft of confidential information of about 1.6 million job seekers
[34].
Vulnerabilities differ in a variety of formats. Some common types of vulnerabilities are
illustrated as follows [2, 21 , 90, 97]:
• Memory management: this category contains vulnerabilities, such as buffer over-
flows, integer overflow, dangling pointers, memory leak, double free, use after free,
free of unallocated memory, use of unchecked null returns, and use of uninitialized
pointers. This class of vulnerabilities may result from erratic program behavior in
memory manipulation.
• Input validation: this category contains vulnerabilities, such as format string bugs, as-
sumption of null-termination, improperly handling shell metacharacters, SQL injec-
tion, code injection, E-mail injection, directory traversal, cross-site scripting, HTTP
header injection, and HTTP response splitting. These vulnerabilities result from lack-
ing validation of input parameters.
• Race conditions: this category contains vulnerabilities, such as time-of-check-to-
time-of-use (TOCTOU) and symlink races, which result from creating files in an
insecure way. This class of vulnerabilities are caused by the unexpected dependence
on the relative timing of events.
• API abuse: this category contains bugs like dangerous function, directory restriction
error, and failure to follow guideline/specification. These vulnerabilities are caused
by a caller failing to fulfill the API contract.
• Password management: this type of vulnerabilities results from insecure password
manipulation. It contains vulnerabilities, such as empty string password, hard-coded
password, and password plaintext storage.
Most of the vulnerabilities are caused by buggy code. Only about 36% of vulnerabilities
result in configuration or design problems; the rest are due to programming errors [15]. For
example, cross-site script insertion is due to lack of sanitization for data supplied in the
HTTP Host header. Most of the buffer overflow vulnerabilities are caused by the weak or
non-existent bounds checking on its input. Code injection vulnerabilities result from the
mixing of code and data. This typically happens when attempting to dynamically generate
commands, such as SQL to a database engine with user input [59]. Symlink vulnerabilities
are due to the ambiguity as to which file is affected. This kind of vulnerabilities can be
exploited by making a program affect a file that is not expected to be modified.
2.2.2 Vulnerability Detection Techniques
One of the important components of security testing is vulnerability detection. Various
software vulnerability detection techniques exist. Here we list some of the most popular
vulnerability detection techniques.
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• Extended type systems: this technique addresses programming errors detection in
the compilation process by extending the type system. Type safety check is an inter-
nal phase of some new programming languages, such as Java and C#. As a result,
programs written in such languages are secure against to certain security vulnerabil-
ities, such as illegal memory access. However, some programming languages, such
as C and C++, are non-strong-typing ones [83]. Research efforts have been made
to extend the existing type systems of these languages to incorporate safety check.
For example, CCured [79] targets memory safety for C programs by extending Cs
type system through separating pointer types according to their usage [79,99]. This
technique is limited by its nature. To use this approach for vulnerability detection, it
requires that the security properties is able to be expressed in terms of type inconsis-
tencies.
• Metacompilation [58]: this is a static analysis technique that uses meta, a high-level
program abstraction that is based on State Machine (SM), to specify security prop-
erties. It has two advantages: first, many security properties can be expressed in
SM. Second, the abstraction is easy to understand since SM is a familiar concept in
programming. The transitions between states are labeled as patterns, which match
source code actions. Any transactions that lead to an error state indicate a viola-
tion of the security property. This technique usually focus on temporal properties.
Coverity Prevent [5] is a static code analysis tool that implements metacompilation
techniques. It focuses on C, C++, C# and Java source code.
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• Model checking [41]: it is a technique for formal verification: a desired behavioral
property of a reactive system is verified over a given system (the model) through
exhaustive enumeration of all the states reachable by the system and the behaviors
that traverse through them. MOPS [40] is a model checker that uses this technique.
It focuses on detecting violations of temporal safety properties. The tool works in
two phases. In the first phase, it transforms the program under test into a pushdown
automaton [62]. In the second phase, the model checker intersects the pushdown
automaton with finite state automaton, which defines the security property, to build a
pushdown system. It then traverses the pushdown system in search of reachable error
states. When such a reachable error state is detected, MOPS reports the security prop-
erty violation with the offending path in source code. There is another model-checker
called Moped [69], which utilizes a push-down system to simulate the execution of
a program. Moped performs reachability analysis of a specified program point of a
model, which is represented by Remopla language, and it can generate a concrete
execution path for each reachable program point. The research [88, 98] elaborated
the possibility and scalability of using Moped model checking for vulnerability de-
tection.
• Pattern matching: this technique detects patterns in the parse tree after the code is
analyzed. A parser scans the source code and constructs a parse tree. A rule-based
system then tries to find patterns in the parse tree. The security concern is defined as
the pattern. Any match of these patterns means a potential violation of the security
property. PSCAN [23] is a tools that utilizes the pattern matching technique to detect
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format string vulnerabilities in C code. This technique has limitations since it relies
on the pattern to define the security properties. Only a few security properties can
be specified as patterns. Most of the security properties are temporal ones, which
comprise a sequence of program actions taken at a different time. For most temporal
properties, they cannot be correctly specified as patterns.
• Program annotation induction: program annotation is the task of discovering a set
of invariant assertions and documenting a program with them. These invariants de-
scribe the workings of the program by detailing relationships between the different
variables at specific points [44]. Program annotation induction technique defines se-
curity properties as a set of preconditions and postconditions. The programs under
test are annotated with these properties before verification. The induction is con-
ducted as follows: for each function to be checked, the constraints that are defined
as precondition are propagated, then the accumulated constraints are verified against
the postconditions. During this process, any inconsistency detected is considered to
be a violation of the security property in concern. Some vulnerability detection tools,
such as Daikon [7] and Splint [26], incorporate this technique. This approach is lim-
ited by the fact that it is difficult to fully automate the annotation process, especially
for complex software.
• Fuzz testing: it is a dynamic software testing technique that provides random data to
the inputs of a program. The failure of the program indicates defects are detected.
The advantage of fuzz testing is that the test design is simple, and it can be conducted
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without preconceptions about system behavior [86]. This technique has been used in
some vulnerability detection frameworks such as Peach Fuzzing Platform [22] and
SPIKE [25]. Due to fact that it relies on random test data, this technique may suffer
from poor code coverage.
• Fault injection [91]: this is a dynamic analysis technique that detects defects by ob-
serving system behavior in the presence of faults. This technique can be categorized
into two types: compile-time injection and runtime injection [91]. Compile-time
injection is done in the source code, where simulated faults are injected into the sys-
tem. For runtime injection, a software trigger is used to inject a fault into a software
system during its execution. Various faut injection techniques, such as Ferrari [67],
and Holdeck [14], have been developed.
• Program monitoring: this is a dynamic analysis technique, which monitors the ex-
ecution of the program under test. Insure++ [16] is an example of tools using this
technique. It can automatically detect erroneous memory operations, such as ac-
cesses to freed memory, array bound violations, and freeing unallocated memory.
Insure++ works as follows: first, it conducts code instrumentation for monitoring at
the source code level. Second, it executes the instrumented code and monitor the
execution to detect any erroneous memory operations.
A non-exhaustive list of existing leading security analysis tools [87,99] is shown in Ta-
ble 1 . These tools use various program analysis techniques to detect security vulnerabilities
in software.
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Many vulnerability detection tools are mostly specialized to certain vulnerabilities and
have limited ability and generality. For example, Dmalloc is well-known in detecting mem-
ory management related vulnerabilities, such as buffer over-flow. BOON is specialized at
applying integer range analysis to check if there is out-of-boundary array operation in a C
program. ITS4 focuses on dangerous function calls.
Static analysis tools are usually successful in detecting vulnerabilities. However, they
produces some false positives. On the other hand, dynamic analysis tools are precise, but
they have run-time overhead and need full path coverage test cases. This prevents them
from conducting exhaustive detection along all the paths as static analysis tools do.
2.3 Test Data Generation
Test data generation is a process of searching program inputs that satisfy selected testing
criteria to make the execution of a program under test follow a specific path, or to reach
a program point. In many cases, this is essential, especially for dynamic analysis, where
such behavior is desired.
Generating test data in order to traverse a path involves solving a system of equations.
If the system has no solution we can conclude that the path given is indeed infeasible.
However, solving an arbitrary system of equations is undecidable [46]. Although test data
generation is an undecidable problem, researchers still attempt to develop various methods
and have made some progress.
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Tool's Name Description
BOONfI] A static security testing tool detecting buffer overflow in C code
Coverity Prevent [5] Static analysis tool for general security vulnerability detection in programs
written in C/C++/Java/C#
CodeWizard [3] Static analysis tool for finding dangerous code constructs in programs
written in CIC++
Cppcheck [6] Security testing tool for statically checking C/C++ programs for security
vulnerabilities, such as memory leaks, and coding mistakes
Dmalloc [8] Dynamic memory management flaws detector for C applications
EXE [9] General-purpose dynamic code analysis tool for C applications
Insure++ [16] Runtime memory errors detector for C/C++ code
ITS4[17] Static analysis-based tool that finds defects like dangerous function calls
and potential buffer overflows in C/C++ applications
JNuke [32] Hybrid framework for verification and model checking of Java programs,
which combines run-time verification, explicit-state model checking, and
counter-example exploration
Klocwork[18] General-purpose static code analysis framework targets applications written
in C/C++/Java
MC Checker [19] Model checker for verifying temporal safety properties in C code
MOPS [40] Model checker for detecting violation of temporal safety properties
Ounce [71] Static security testing tools detecting vulnerabilities in source code based
on model analysis
PC-lint [11] General-purpose static code analysis tool for programs written in C/C++
Rational
PurifyPlus [24]
A framework used by software developers to detect memory access errors
in programs, especially those written in C or C++
RATS [66] Static security auditing utility for C and C++ code that finds potentially
dangerous function calls
Splint [26] Static analysis tool targeting buffer overflow, format errors for C code
Valgrind [28] An instrumentation framework for building dynamic analysis tools for
detecting memory management for programs written in
C/C++/Java/Perl/Python/Fortran/Ada
Table 1: Security Analysis Tools
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The past few years have witnessed a great research interest targeting automatic test data
generation. Many approaches have been proposed including random test data generation
[37], directed random test data generation [54], genetic and evolutionary algorithms [39],
chaining approach [48], iterative relaxation approach [56], and symbolic execution for test
data generation [36,38,42,52,63,84]. Recently, model-checkers have been suggested for
test-case generation [50].
In 1996 Ferguson and Korel [48] classified these methods into three categories:
• Random approach: randomly chooses an arbitrary input value from the set of all
possible input values of the program under test;
• Goal-oriented approach: generates test data for a program point regardless which
path to follow;
• Path-oriented approach: generates test data for a specific path.
Another type of classification of test data generation approaches is based on the soft-
ware analysis technique they use. It categories the approaches as follows:
• Static approach: does not require the program under test to be executed, but work on
the analysis of the program under test;
• Dynamic approach: involves the repeated execution of the program under test during
a directed search for test data that meet the desired criterion.
Static techniques typically use symbolic execution to obtain constraints on input vari-
ables for a particular testing criterion. Symbolic execution works by traversing a control
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flow graph of the program under test and constructing symbolic representations of the inter-
nal variables in terms of the input variables. Branches within the code introduce constraints
on the variables. Solutions to these constraints represent the desired test data. There are
limitations with this approach. It is difficult to use symbolic execution for various cases
including recursion, array operations, where indices depend on input data, and loop struc-
ture [89]. In 1976, Miller [77] proposed a dynamic approach to test data generation, in
which test data generation is formulated and solved as a numerical optimization problem.
Table 2 categories most of the approaches to test data generation based on the classifi-
cations mentioned above.
















Table 2: Test Data Generation Approaches
The chaining approach was proposed by Roger Ferguson and Bogdan Korel [48] in
1996. In the chaining approach, test data are derived based on the actual execution of
the program under test. The chaining approach uses data dependence analysis to guide
the search process, i.e., data dependence analysis automatically identifies statements that
affect the execution of a particular selected statement. The chaining approach uses these
statements to form a sequence of statements that is to be executed prior to the execution of
the selected statement. The basic idea of chaining approach is to build up a chain of nodes
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that are relevant to the execution of the goal node iteratively during execution.
Inspired by Darwin's evolution theory, Holland proposed the genetic algorithms in 1992
[61], which is a heuristic search algorithm based on the idea of maintaining a population
of sample solutions, each of which fitness has been calculated. The successive populations
are evolved using the genetic operations, such as crossover and mutation. The basic idea
of genetic algorithms is that through the use of the genetic operations the population will
converge towards a global solution [61]. The concept of applying genetic algorithms for
test data generation was introduced by Michael et al in 1997 [76]. Given a set of sample
data (population of sample), test data is generated through the evolution of manipulating
the sample data.
Iterative relaxation for test data generation was proposed by Gupta, Mathur, and Soffa
in 1998 [56]. In this technique, the input value is arbitrarily chosen from a given domain
during the first iteration. In the following iterations, the input is iteratively adjusted to
obtain desired outcome so that all the branch predicates along a given path are satisfied.
During the iterations, the program statements that are relevant to the evaluation of each
branch predicate on the given path are executed to construct a set of linear constraints. The
constraints are then solved to obtain the adjustment for the input. The adjusted input then
is used for the next iteration. This approach is dynamic and path-oriented.
Random testing is the simplest method of generation techniques and at the same time it
is the most unreliable technique for testing [46]. This technique has the weakest coverage
criteria. It randomly picks any of the paths from Control Flow Graph (CFG) and generate
test data for that path. The obvious disadvantage of random approach is the low efficiency
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since it merely relies on probability. Random testing approach is often used as a benchmark
since it has the lowest efficiency in test data generation.
There are some test data generators that make use of the symbolic execution tech-
nique [36,38,42,52,63]. In symbolic execution, instead of using actual values, symbols
representing arbitrary values is used. The execution proceeds as in a normal execution
except that values may be symbolic formulas over the input symbols. The basic idea of
symbolic execution is to generate an expression in terms of input variables [46]. Sym-
bolic execution has been popular since the 70's. However, it has some drawbacks: first it
is expensive in consuming resources. Second, it has technical problems in handling input
variable dependent loops, subprogram calls, and array references [43].
In 1990, Korel proposed an alternative approach to test-data generation based on function-
minimization methods and dynamic analysis [70]. When the program under test is exe-
cuted, its execution flow is monitored. Any execution flow that leads the execution of the
program under test away from the selected path is classified as undesirable one. During the
program execution, if an undesirable execution flow is detected, the function-minimization
search is conducted to find the values of input variables for which the chosen path is tra-
versed. Furthermore, dynamic data-flow analysis is utilized to determine those input vari-
ables responsible for the undesirable program behavior, which dramatically increases the
efficiency of the search process [70].
A model-checker is a tool that is designed for formal verification. It takes two inputs:
the model of the program under test and a temporal logic formula, which describes the
security property in concern. It explored the entire state space of the model to verify if
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there exist any violations of the security property. If violations are detected, then the model-
checker returns a trace which is a sequence of states leading from the initial state to error
state. Each state in the trace describes the values of all variables, including input variables,
of the model. The values of input variables are used as test data [50].
These approaches vary in nature and target different goals. For instance, random test
data generation strives to feed the test data to the program under test randomly in an attempt
to execute different paths and hopefully result in some useful test suites being created. This
approach is easy to implement. However, it is time-consuming in test data generation.
Goal-oriented approach, on the other hand, targets a specific point in the software and
attempts to generate test suites to reach this desired target without caring for which path
to follow. In this thesis, the vulnerability detection framework we are going to propose is
mainly targeting temporal security property, in which a sequence of statements need to be
executed orderly to result in a violation. As such, we are interested in generating test data
for a specific path, which might violate security properties. Consequently, path-oriented
approach is more suitable to achieve reachability. On the other hand, symbolic execution
suffers when generating test data for programs that contain dependent loops, subprogram
calls, and array references. Due to this fact, it is not suitable to use symbolic approach to
generate test data for complex programs.
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2.4 Summary
To summarize, in this chapter we discussed the traditional software testing, security testing,
and test data generation. We discussed different types of software testing, such as correct-
ness testing, performance testing, and reliability testing. For security testing, we mainly
discussed the types of vulnerabilities, and the vulnerability detection techniques. In test




This chapter introduces our proposed approach for vulnerability detection. It focuses on
security property specification, vulnerability detection and dynamic verification with test
data generation.
3.1 A Synergy between Static and Dynamic Analysis
There are many different types of software analysis techniques for vulnerability detection.
Among these, there are two major types: static analysis and dynamic analysis.
Static analysis is the process of evaluating software or a software component based on
the syntactic and semantic information inferred from its form, structure, content and/or
documentation without program execution [29]. Typically, static analysis is conservative
and sound [47].
Some static analysis approaches like PSCAN [23] use pattern matching techniques to
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look for insecure patterns, such as insecure function calls in the source code. This approach
is simple, and effective in finding certain flaws. However, it is limited by nature since only
few security properties can be specified and checked with string matching. In order to deal
with more complex security flaws, some static analysis approaches utilize lexical analysis.
It preprocess and converts the source files into a sequence of tokens and then match the
resulting token stream against the predefined security specifications. However, most se-
curity vulnerabilities are not straightforward. To identify them, semantic interpretation is
needed. To incorporate semantic analysis, Abstract Syntax Tree (AST), which is a struc-
ture describing the code in an abstract form is created. Static analysis is used to conduct
a semantic analysis on the AST. It is conservative by considering all (syntactic) program
paths. However, it might produce some amount of false positives.
There are two forms of static analysis for vulnerability detection: security code in-
spection and automatic static analysis. Security code inspection is time-consuming and
requires the auditor to be a security expert. In addition, for large and complex programs,
security code inspections may be impractical, and error prone. Automatic static analysis
has advantages over manual security code inspection. First, the evaluation of a program
can be done efficiently compared with security code inspection. Second, it does not re-
quire the operators to have the same level of knowledge in security as a human auditor.
Consequently, using static analysis tools for vulnerability detection can reduce the cost and
improve efficiency.
In contrast to static analysis, dynamic analysis derives properties that hold for one or
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more execution by examining the running program usually through program instrumenta-
tion [72]. Dynamic analysis is precise. It usually involves instrumenting the program under
test to verify or record certain aspects of its runtime behavior. The instrumented code is
used to collect the precise information needed to address a particular property. In addition,
with code instrumentation, dynamic analysis is able to relate changes in program inputs to
changes in internal program behavior and program outputs, since all are directly observable
and linked by the program execution [35].
While dynamic analysis has its advantages, it is not comprehensive since it suffers from
the coverage issue. To achieve the latter, we need to observe every possible execution,
which might require an infinite number of executions. Due to this fact, dynamic analysis
generally does not prove that a program satisfies a particular property. However, it can
detect violations of properties as well as provide useful information to the security analyst
about the behavior of the programs under test [35]. Therefore, dynamic analysis is not
enough by itself to address the problem of vulnerability detection in general, but it is very
suitable for vulnerability verification.
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Table 3: Static Analysis vs. Dynamic Analysis
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Clearly, both types of analysis techniques have their tradeoffs. Table 3 summarizes the
pros and cons of these two approaches. The two approaches are complementary in many
aspects. Therefore, it is desirable to generate information from static analysis for runtime
verification. Accordingly, if we combine static analysis and dynamic analysis, then we
will establish a synergy that will result into an improved analysis. To this end, we propose
a synergy bewteen static analysis and dynamic analysis for vulnerability detection. The
static analysis will be accommodated to guide the dynamic analysis. Our approach uses
static analysis to point to potential vulnerabilities, then dynamic analysis to verify whether
they are actual vulnerabilities. To link the static analysis with dynamic analysis, test cases
are needed. This is where the test data generation comes into play.
3.2 Description
To detect vulnerabilities in the systematic way, four factors need to be considered. In the
first place, we need to be able to specify the security property. In the second place, we
should be able to point to potential vulnerable program points/paths. In the third place,
we should be able to generate test data for further dynamic analysis. In the fourth place,
we should be able to conduct dynamic analysis to verify vulnerabilities. Accordingly, Fig-
ure 2 illustrates the components of our approach as well as the techniques used in each
component.
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The first component is the security specification, which allows a user to specify a se-
curity property by using security automata. The second component is potential vulnera-
bility detection, which utilizes static analysis to detect potential vulnerabilities. The third
component is test data generation, which uses static analysis, dynamic analysis, code in-
strumentation, Moped reachability checker, and program slicing to generate test cases for
further vulnerability verification. The fourth component is dynamic vulnerability verifica-
tion, which performs dynamic analysis to verify a vulnerability using the test cases that are
generated. It utilizes techniques like security automata, and code instrumentation for pro-




I Static Analysis Model Checking I Remopla
Test Data Generation
Dynamic Analysis Code Instrumentation
Static Analysis Model Checking Program Slicing
Dynamic Vulnerability Verification
Dynamic Analysis Security Automata Code Instrumentation
Figure 2: System Architecture
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3.3 Security Properties Specification
To validate software against specific security violations, security analysts need to formally
specify the security properties they need to test the software against. In this thesis, we use
security automata [85] as the specification language for temporal security properties.
A security automaton is a deterministic finite or countably infinite state machine [73].
A temporal security property can be expressed by using a security automaton. Nodes in-
side a security automaton define the states of a program under test, and labeled transitions
constitute program operations. The start node represents the initial state of the program
under test. The error state is the violation of the security property in concern. The transi-
tions between states depend on (i) the automaton state, (ii) the behavior of the program, and
(iii) the argument of the method [64]. Figure 3 illustrates how a security property can be
expressed as a security automaton. The security property specified in Figure 3 is related to
privilege escalation: Since a privileged process has full access permission to the system, it
should not make certain system calls that run untrusted programs without first dropping all
privileges; Otherwise they may have full access to the system. One such system call is ex-
ecl. To limit the privilege of a program executed by execl, a privileged process should









Figure 3: Sample Security Automaton
3.4 Code Instrumentation
To monitor the runtime behavior of a program under test and collect dynamic information,
monitoring code needs to be added to the program. To achieve this goal, code instrumenta-
tion is necessary.
Various code instrumentation techniques exist. The main code instrumentation tech-
niques include preprocessor macros instrumentation, library inclusion instrumentation, li-
brary replacement instrumentation, parser-level instrumentation, binary wrapping of object
code, aspect-oriented programming (AOP) instrumentation, and compiler-assisted instru-
mentation [99].
We chose the compiler-assisted instrumentation approach. This choice is justified by
the fact that compilers have the knowledge of the lexical structure and semantics of the
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program being instrumented, and they are capable of building and analyzing the AST and
the control flow graph of the program. This allows us to precisely select the exact program
points where instrumentation code should be injected.
3.4.1 GCC
GNU Compiler Collection (GCC) [12] is chosen as the code instrumentation utility based
on the following reasons:
• GCC is the default compiler for most open-source software;
• GCC is a multi-platform compiler. It is widely supported by various operation sys-
tems, such as Windows, Linux, Unix, etc;
• GCC can be extended because of the availability of the source code;
• GCC is a collection of compilers, which support many programming languages. Cur-
rently, the main GCC distribution contains front ends for C (gcc), C++ (g++), Objec-
tive C, Fortran, Java (GCJ), and Ada (GNAT);
• The Tree Single Static Assignment (TREE-SSA) [80] framework, which performs
optimization for tree representation of source code, is merged into the official release
of GCC (Starting from version 4.0). It offers an easy access to control-flow graphs,
use-def chains, and point-to alias information that enable dataflow analysis;
• GIMPLE is the language-independent intermediate representation of GCC. With
GCCs internal APIs, it is easy to manipulate the GIMPLE representation. Code
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Figure 4: GCC Architecture
The GCC version 4 and above is divided into front-end, middle-end, and back-end.
Different front ends exist for preprocessing different languages. The middle-end conducts
transformation and optimization. The back-end, which is language-independent, is respon-
sible to generate the final output: object code. This structure makes GCC to be capa-
ble of supporting a variety of languages. Given the source code, the front-end generates
GENERIC representation, which is universal for all all languages. However, the GENERIC
language is still difficult for the computer to understand since it contains complex state-
ments and nested expressions. Accordingly, it is then transformed to a three-address code
called GIMPLE in the middle-end. Temporary variables are used to simplify the the nested
expression. Complicated structures are decomposed by using goto statements and corre-
sponding labels. The middle-end further transforms the GIMPLE representation to Register
Transfer Language (RTL). At the same time, the middle-end goes through a list of high-
level optimization passes, such as alias analysis and dead code elimination. Consecutively,
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the back-end generates object code. Figure 4 shows the relationship of the three compo-
nents.
GENERIC and GIMPLE Languages
GENERIC is the language-independent intermediate tree structure that various GCC front-
ends, which exist for different programming languages, produce. The GENERIC repre-
sentation is a high-level AST representation. It is capable of representing all languages
supported by the GCC compiler. The GCC middle-end performs many passes of AST-level
analysis on the GENERIC tree, GENERIC representation is very well suited to represent
the output of a parser. However, it is difficult to perform optimization on GENERIC due to
its complexity.
In the GNU Compiler Collection, GIMPLE is an intermediate representation (IR) of the
program, in which complex expressions are split into a three-address code using temporary
variables [12]. Most CFG-level optimization passes are performed on the GIMPLE tree.
Each GIMPLE tree is used to build a GIMPLE/CFG. Nested expressions are decomposed
to a three-address form with temporary variables storing intermediate values. Control struc-
tures such as for and while loops in C are replaced by gotos. Complex conditional
expressions are decomposed. For example, if (condì I I cond2) stmt; is trans-
lated into
if (condì) goto Ll;






GIMPLE has internal representation for expressions. Table 4, extracted from GCC



























Table 4: GIMPLE Internal Representation for Expressions
After version 4, GCC internals are very different from previous distributions. All code
is translated into GIMPLE and analysis is conducted over these representations. Appendix
A lists the GIMPLE representation of a sample C program.
3.4.2 GCC Extension
We extend GCC for code instrumentation by adding a new pass to it. The implementation
is based on the GCC core distribution version 4.2.0 [10]. We keep all the functionalities
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of the original GCC compiler. The instrumentation is done by modifying the GIMPLE
representation in the middle-end during the compilation process. The implementation of
the APIs for monitoring is written in C++ and built into a shared library with C interfaces.















Figure 5: GCC Extension
Four steps are involved to extend GCC for code instrumentation:
1 . Add a new pass to GCC;
2. Identify the locations to instrument;
3. Construct new GIMPLE representation of the calls of the APIs for monitoring;
4. Merge the original GIMPLE representation of the program under test with the new
GIMPLE representation.
First, a new pass needs to be added to GCC, which divides its different level of tasks
into passes. Yang [99] explains the details of how to add a new pass into GCC. All the
passes are managed by the pass manager, which is located in the following GCC files:
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passes . c, tree-optimize . c and tree-pass .h. The job of the pass manager is
to run all the individual passes in the correct order, and do the standard bookkeeping that
applies to every pass. Each pass is defined by a structure that represents everything we
need to know about that pass, such as when it should be run, how it should be run, what
intermediate language form or on-the-side data structures it needs, etc. The passes can be
classified as follows:
• Initializers: such as pass_referenced_vars, pass_build_cfg
• Analysis: such as pass_build_ssa














unsigned int todo_flags_f inish;
char letter;
};
Figure 6: Pass Description
Figure 6 shows the struct used to represent a pass. The main attributes of the
struct are described as follows: name defines the name of the pass. The gate ()


















point function execute ( ) , which holds the code to run, is called; otherwise it will not
be executed. The pointer sub points to the first one of a list of sub-passes to run, depen-
dent on gate predicate. The pointer next points to sibling class passes are chained together
with NEXT_PASS in init_optimization_passes. The static_pass_number
is used as a fragment of the dump file name. Each pass can define its own separate timer
tv_id. Timers are started/stopped automatically by the pass manager. Timer handles
(timevars) are defined in timevar . def. The todo_f lags_start and todo_-
f lags_f inish are flags indicating common sets things to do before and after a pass.
After we define a pass, the pass must be registered so that it can run in some particular
order, and the pass manager arranges for everything to happen in the correct order. To
register a pass, we modify the passes . c, which holds the pass manager. Figure 7 shows
how to register our new pass pass_security_tesing in the pass manager, which is
located in passes . c.
init_optimization_passes (void) { ?
2
NEXT_PASS (pass_mudflap_2) ; 3
NEXT_PASS (pass_security_tesing) ; 4
NEXT_PASS (pass_f ree_datastructures) ; 5
6
} ?
Figure 7: Pass Registration
Second, we need to identify the locations, in which we are interested to instrument. In
this thesis, our points of interest are the following:
1 . Beginning of the program
2. Beginning of each basic block, which is a straight-line sequence of code with only
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one entry point and only one exit [12].
3. Environmental interactions [75]:
(a) User interactions
(b) Interactions with the file system
(c) Interactions with memory
(d) Interactions with the operating system via system calls
(e) Interactions with other components of the same software system
(f) Interactions with dynamically linked libraries
(g) Interaction with other software via APIs
(h) Interaction with other software via interprocess communication
(i) Interactions with global data such as environment variables and the registry
(j) Interactions with the network
(k) Interactions with physical devices
(1) Dependencies on the initial environment
4. Conditional statements
5. End of the program
To identify the locations to instrument, we traverse the GIMPLE tree and check the node
type. For example, the conditional statements are expressed as a type of COND_EXPR in
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GIMPLE. If the tree node of current iteration is of type COND_EXPR, then we find one of
our interests.
Third, construct the GIMPLE tree for the function calls. For each type of C state-
ment there is a function that constructs a tree node of the corresponding type. For exam-
ple, tree build_function_call (tree function, tree params) builds a
CALL_EXPR node for a function call. It takes the identifier of the function name and the
arguments as its parameters. The function finds the function declaration using lookup_-
name ( ) and type casts the arguments using default_conversion ( ) [51].
Fourth, modify the GIMPLE tree, which represents the original program. After con-
structing the GIMPLE representation of the functions calls, we merge the new GIMPLE
tree with the original one. Mostly, the code instrumentation is dealing with the GIMPLE
tree. Table 5 shows the APIs provided by GCC that allow one to traverse a statement list
and to manipulate it:
Function Purpose
tsi_start (stmt_list; get an iterator pointingat list head
tsi_last (stmt__list) get an iterator pointingat list tail
tsi_end_p (iter) is end of list?
tsi_stmt (iter) get current element
t s i_spl i t_statement_list_.be fore (&iter) split elements at iter
tsi_link_after (&iter, stmt, mode) link chain after iter
tsi_next (&iter) next element of the list
append_to_statement_list (tree, &stmt_list) append tree tostmt list
Table 5: Tree Construction API [51]
With GCC extension, we can instrument additional code into the program under test
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for test data generation purpose. The code instrumentation is done during the compila-
tion. Once the program under test is compiled successfully, an instrumented executable is
generated.
3.5 Is Reachability Enough?
Assume we are able to point to potential security vulnerabilities using static analysis, and
generate test data to reach the program sites in question. Can we say that we prove the
existence of the security vulnerabilities? To answer this question, we need to know the
types of security vulnerabilities that we are detecting.
There is a wide spectrum of software security vulnerabilities. Different classifica-
tions of those vulnerabilities can however be made based on their nature, the way they
can be manifested, their level of harmfulness, the difficulty level to detect them, etc. In
our research, we classify the vulnerabilities based on the matter of reachability, where the
execution is sufficient to violate a security property. In that context, we refer to those
vulnerabilities as reachability security vulnerabilities. Otherwise, we categorize them as
non-reachability ones.
To detect non-reachability vulnerabilities, sometimes only generating test data to follow
the suspicious path is not sufficient. In some cases, even we reach the target following a
specific path, the violation of security properties might not be triggered. Examples of such
include divide-by-zero errors, buffer-overflow, numeric underflow and overflow. This kind
of vulnerabilities will be triggered only when some additional constraints are satisfied.
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For example, the string copy library functions in C are vulnerable to buffer overflow at-
tacks. The destination buffer must be large enough to hold the source string. This gives the
attacker the opportunity to send an input that is larger than the buffer size, which will result
into overflowing the buffer. For this vulnerability detection, the generation of test data that
satisfies all constraints along a path to reach program points where the vulnerable func-
tions are located is insufficient. To prove that a site is vulnerable, an additional constraint
sizeof (destination) <sizeof (source) must also be satisfied. For instance,
in Figure 8, only generating test cases to reach the vulnerability site strcpy (dest,
src) is not enough. For example," if we generate test cases with x=13, y=0, the ex-
ecution of the program can reach the vulnerable site. However, the buffer-over will not
be triggered. To mitigate this problem, we add a new constraint If ( Strien (src) >
Strien (dest) ) before the call of the strcpy function so that the test cased generated




scanf ("%d", Sx) ;
scanf ("%d",&y) ;
char * dest = (char *) malloc(y + 16);
char * src = "buffer overflow";
If (x > 12) {
//vulnerable site
strcpy (dest, src) ;
} else {
}










size of destination<size of source
size of destination<size of source
size of input string>size of buffer
size of input string>size of buffer
Table 6: Non-reachability Vulnerability
By adding such a constraint into the constraint set along a suspicious path, we reduce
the non-reachability problem into a reachability one. Table 6 shows some non-reachability
vulnerabilities and the additional constraints which ensure the violation of the security
properties.
Many of the non-reachability vulnerabilities are buffer-overflow related vulnerabilities.
The United States Department of Homeland Security [2] reports a taxonomy that is com-
prised of 174 security vulnerabilities on its web site buildsecurityin . us-cert .
gov. We look at the vulnerabilities listed one by one, and found out that among these
174, 71 vulnerabilities were buffer-overflow related vulnerabilities, which can further be
reduced to reachability ones.
Based on our classification of the security vulnerabilities, and the introduction of adding
additional constraints, which are used to guarantee the violation of the security property,
we can verify the existence of a non-reachability vulnerability by generating test data that
satisfies the original constrains along the suspicious path and the additional constrains. As
a result, some non-reachability vulnerabilities could be converted into reachability ones.
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3.6 System Design
The system is designed to use the synergy between static and dynamic analysis for vulner-
ability detection. It contains three main components. First, a static analysis tool [57,98],
namely the Static Vulnerability Revealer (SVR), is used to detect the vulnerabilities against
the security properties defined by users. Second, a test data generator is responsible to gen-
erate test cases to provide the reachability to the vulnerable sites. Third, given the test data,
a dynamic analysis tool named Dynamic Vulnerability Detection (DVD) [99] is utilized to
verify the vulnerabilities detected by SVR so as to minimize false positives. In this thesis,
we mainly focus on the test data generator. For test data generation, we utilize two different
techniques. For small size software, such as embedded software, we use Moped reachabil-
ity checker with program slicing to generate test data. Otherwise, a hybrid (combination of
static and dynamic analysis) approach is utilized. The whole system design is illustrated in
Figure 9.
The system starts with SVR, which takes the security specification and uses model
checking techniques to detect suspicious paths that might contain the violations against the
predefined security properties. Due to the nature of static analysis, false positives might
also be generated. To verify a vulnerability, test data generation is needed. The test data
generator takes the suspicious path, and tries to generate the test case such that the execution
of the program can follow the suspicious path. Once the test data is generated, DVD takes
the generated test data, executes the program, and monitors the execution of the program
to verify the vulnerabilities.
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Figure 9: System Design
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3.6.1 Static Vulnerability Revealer
Among the static vulnerability detection techniques, model-checking is a promising one.
The research [88, 98] elaborated the possibility and scalability of using Moped model
checker to detect vulnerabilities. SVR is based on that research.
Given source code of the program under test, and a formally specified security property,
SVR main concern is to find out all (the largest set possible) program paths that have the
potential of violating the security property in concern. We refer to these paths as suspicious
paths. SVR is based on two major techniques: static analysis and model checking.
In SVR, a security property is modeled as a security automaton, specifying the erro-
neous behavior using sequences of program actions. An error state is introduced to
represent the risk state for each automaton. A synchronization mechanism allows program
actions to trigger the state changing of the automaton. If the error state is reached, a
sequence of program actions violating the given property has been detected.
SVR automates the model construction process, including the generation of program
model, property model, and the synchronization mechanism. Also, to mitigate the state
space explosion problem of model checking, SVR uses static analysis to reduce the state
space. By analyzing the CFG and Data Flow Graph (DFG), SVR is able to extract property-
relevant behaviors and discard property-irrelevant information. The model generated by the
static analysis is represented by a model specification language Remopla.
SVR employs a model-checker called Moped [69]. Moped performs reachability anal-
ysis of a specified program point of the given Remopla program, and it can generate a con-
crete execution path for each reachable program point. A set of program points that may
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trigger the automaton to reach the error state is extracted at the static analysis phase, each
of which is given to the model-checker for reachability analysis. In other word, SVR trans-
forms the vulnerability detection problem into reachability analysis. More details about
SVR can be found in [98].
3.6.2 Test Data Generator
To verify vulnerabilities along a suspicious path detected by the SVR, the test data gener-
ation should follow. Given a suspicious path, test data generator is responsible to generate
test data to make the execution of the program under test to follow it. We have developed
two different approaches for test data generation:
• Test data generation using Moped reachability checker and program slicing. The
detail of this approach is discussed in Chapter 4;
• Hybrid approach for test data generation. This approach utilizes the power of static
and dynamic analysis for test data generation. The details of this approach are dis-
cussed in Chapter 5.
3.6.3 Dynamic Vulnerability Detector
With the test data generated, Dynamic Vulnerability Detector (DVD) [99] can execute the
instrumented program under test and then monitor the execution to collect concrete evi-
dences of the violation of security properties. Once the violation of security properties is
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detected, DVD stops the execution, or suppresses the action depending on the user config-
uration, then generates a test report, which details where and when vulnerabilities occur.
For example, for memory leak, it can trace the actual memory address and the size of the
leak.
In general, DVD provides the following functionalities:
• Allows a user to specify the security properties with a graphical interface: the security
specifications are expressed as edit automata. DVD provides a graphical interface to
let the analysts visually draw state diagrams. A user can define the states of the finite
state machine, the transition between the states as well as the transition guard, which
determines whether or not an event will trigger the transition. After that, the system
transforms the visual representation of the finite state machine into a language used
by the State Machine Compiler (SMC) [27]. The SMC then generates the C++ code,
which is a shared library with C interfaces, to represent the state machines;
• Instruments code to the program under test: In order to monitor the execution of the
program under test, code instrumentation is needed. DVD injects code fragments
into the program under test so as to synchronize the state machine and the program
under test. By checking if the state machine reaches an error state, DVD detects
whether a violation has occurred;
• Generates test report: once a violation is detected, DVD gathers the dynamic infor-
mation during the execution of the program under test, and generates the report. The




In this chapter, we proposed a hybrid vulnerability detection approach that covers the se-
curity properties specification, potential vulnerability detection, test data generation, and
dynamic verification. In addition, we introduced our extended GCC for code instrumenta-
tion. By combining the static and dynamic analysis, we take advantages of both of them so
as to increase the efficiency and accuracy of the vulnerability detection. In our approach,
static analysis is used to find all the possible vulnerable sites of a program, and test data
generation and dynamic analysis are utilized to verify the possible vulnerabilities so as to
reduce the false positives.
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Chapter 4
Test Data Generation Using Moped
This chapter introduces the test data generation approach using Moped reachability checker
and program slicing. Model-checkers have recently been suggested for automated software
test-case generation. However, the use of a model-checker comes at the price of potential
performance problems that are linked to state explosion [50]. If the model used for test-case
generation is complex, then model-checker based approaches can be very slow, or even not
applicable at all. To mitigate the problem, we propose anew approach that combines the
Moped reachability checker with program slicing for test data generation.
4.1 Moped Reachability Checker
Moped reachability checker is a model checker for pushdown systems [69]. The checker
simulates program execution based on the Remopla [81] language, which is used to model
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a program, for all possible arguments within a finite range and generate coverage informa-
tion for these executions. Given a target in a Remopla representation, the checker attempts
to verify whether, or not, that target is reachable. If the target is reachable, then the checker
would generate a trace, including test data values, which would lead the execution to the
target. The formal language used by Moped reachability checker is a state transition sys-
tem, where each possible value for each variable is represented by a state. As a result, it
faces the state space explosion problem. Consequently, there is a large performance over-
head for these generations to be made. Generally, the performance of the model checker is
affected by the range of the variables and the complexity of the program, such as number
of variables, number of lines of code and number of function calls, etc.
The checker, as designed, is not suitable for our purpose of security test data generation
since it is concerned with producing data to reach a specific target without any regard
to a specify path. For our system, we require test data to be generated for a specified
path; that is reaching the target through any path is insufficient. Consequently, we need
to simplify the model, which is a Remopla representation, used by the checker so that
it contains only the code fragments along the suspicious path. Additionally, we need to
enhance the performance of the checking process. To achieve these goals, we resort to
program slicing to optimize the Remopla representation. Subsection 4.2 details the program
slicing component of our model.
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4.2 Program Slicing
Program slicing was introduced by Mark Weiser in 1981 [93], as a method of abstracting
programs and reducing them to a minimal form that is still capable of producing an original
subset of behavior. A slicer is an executable program that performs identical actions to a
specified subset of the original program. Depending on how minimal a slice is desired, a
slicing criterion is set, which specifies a window for observing the program behavior.
In our approach, the slicer works on the GIMPLE representation of the program under
test instead of the original source code. Our decision to work on GIMPLE representation
was driven by the following factors: first, GIMPLE contains control flow and data flow
information, which is necessary for slicing. Second, some optimization has been done by
GCC before generating GIMPLE representation, such as partial redundancy elimination,
dead code and unreachable code elimination.
Slices are produced by computing consecutive sets of transitively relevant statements
based on the control flow and data flow information. Given the control flow information,
we identify and remove any basic block that is not related to the suspicious path. This
results into a subset of the original GIMPLE representation, which contains only blocks
along the suspicious path. Following that, using the data flow information, we identify and
remove all unrelated variables as well as reductant code. Figure 10 illustrates a GIMPLE
representation containing five basic blocks. However, the suspicious path contains only
basic blocks 0, 1, 4. First we remove those basic blocks that are not related to the path,
which results in the removal of basic block 2 and 3 from the GIMPLE representation.
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Second, unused variables like x2, ?2? in the basic blocks are eliminated. Figure 1 1 shows
the resulting GIMPLE representation.
4.3 Architecture
The architecture of test data generation utilizing Moped reachability checker and program
slicing is shown in Figure 12. This architecture contains six components that are:
• XML-Dump [45]: an extended GCC that dumps GIMPLE representation in XML
format;
• XML-Parser: an XML parser written in C++, with which object-oriented tree rep-
resentations of GIMPLE are constructed from the XML files generated by XML-
Dump;
• Static Analyzer: it scans the GIMPLE tree and gathers control flow and data flow
information along a suspicious path. It then passes the information to the program
slicer;
• Program Slicer: it simplifies the GIMPLE representation into a minimal, with a slic-
ing criterion window that includes the suspicious path and the set of relevant variables
to that path;

















if (xl.O == 100) goto <L0>; else goto <L1>;
# SUCC: 1 (true) 2 (false)
# BLOCK 1




goto <bb 4> (<L3>) ;
# SUCC: 4 (fallthru)
# BLOCK 2
# PRED: 0 (false)
<L1>: ;
x2 . 1 = x2;
if (x2.1 == 200) goto <L2>; else goto <L3>;
# SUCC: 3 (true) 4 (false)
# BLOCK 3
# PRED: 2 (true)
<L2>: ;
open (&filename);
# SUCC: 4 (fallthru)
# BLOCK 4
# PRED: 1 (fallthru) 2 (false) 3 (fallthru)
<L3>:;













# PRED: ENTRY (fallthru)
filename = "thefile.txt";
scanf (&"%"[0], sxl);
xl. 0 = xl;
if (xl.O.== 100) goto <L0>; else goto <L1>;
# SUCC: 1 (true) 2 (false)
# BLOCK 1
# PRED: 0 (true)
<L0>: ;
access (Sfilename, 2) ;
open (Sfilename);
goto <bb 4> (<L3>) ;
# SUCC: 4 (fallthru)
# BLOCK 4
# PRED: 1 (fallthru) 2 (false) 3 (fallthru)
<L3>: ;

























Figure 12: System Architecture of Moped Test Data Generator
• Moped Reachability Checker: given a Remopla model, this component is responsible
for the generation of test data.
The test data generation process can be summarized as follows: given source code
and a suspicious path, the XML-Dump and XML-Parser work together to generate object-
oriented GIMPLE tree representation of the program under test. The static analyzer then
performs static analysis to gather control flow and data flow information that are related to a
suspicious path. This information is then given to the program slicer that produces a sliced
GIMPLE representation. This representation is then injected into the program abstractor,
which transforms it to a Remopla model. Finally, the generated Remopla model is used as
an input to the Moped reachability checker for the generation of test data.
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4.4 Approach Evaluation
With program slicing technique, the Remopla model used by the Moped reachability checker
is simplified. Consequently, the performance of the checking process can be improved. To
evaluate the approach, we generated test data for a sample program listed in the Appendix
A before slicing and after slicing. As shown in Figure 13, program slicing results in large













Slicing influence on test data generation
- Sample program




Figure 13: Slicing Influence on Test Data Generation
This approach is limited by the Moped reachability checker itself, which suffers from
state space explosion problem. Therefore, the performance of this approach is affected by
the complexity of the program under test. Furthermore, the degree of simplicity of sliced
programs depends on the coupling of programs along the suspicious path with the rest parts
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of the program under test.
4.5 Summary
In this chapter, we presented the architecture for test data generation, which takes advan-
tages of Moped reachability checker and program slicing. Due to the limitation of this
approach, it mainly targets safety-critical software of relatively smaller sizes, such as em-
bedded software. In order to expand the flexibility and scalability of our vulnerability
detection framework, we propose a hybrid approach for test data generation in chapter 5.
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Chapter 5
Hybrid Approach to Test Data
Generation
This chapter introduces a hybrid approach for test data generation, which uses the infor-
mation gathered form static and dynamic analysis to guide the test data generation process.
Before proceeding further with the discussion of the hybrid approach to test data genera-
tion, we need to define the following terms:
Definition 1. Problem node: a basic block, where the execution of a program under test
follows an undesired branch.
Definition 2. Conditional basic block: a basic block that ends with a conditional statement.
Definition 3. Execution path: a sequence ofbasic blocks: path = (bbi, bb2, ...,bbn).
Definition 4. Suspicious path: an execution path that might contain violations ofsecurity
properties.
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Definition 5. Desired branch: a branch ofa conditional statement, which takes the execu-
tion of the program under test to follow the suspicious path.
Definition 6. Undesired branch: any branch of a conditional statement, which leads the
execution awayfrom the suspicious path.
Definition 7. Controlling variables: variables appearing in a conditional statement.
Definition 8. Constraint function: a function constructedfrom the conditional statement.
A conditional statement has the following format: lhs op rhs, where the lhs represents the
operand on the left-hand side, the rhs represents the operand on the right-hand side, and
the op represents the comparison operator, such as <,<,>,>, f, =· The format of the
constraintfunction depends on the op and the branch that the execution needs to follow.
Definition 9. Constraint value: the concrete value of a constraintfunction calculated dy-
namically.
5.1 General Description of the Approach
For our purpose of test data generation, our interest is to generate test data for a suspicious
path rather than a program point. Accordingly, our test data generation approach should
be a path-oriented one. During the survey of test data generation techniques, we found
that Korel's approach [70] is a promising one. Korel's approach is a dynamic one, which
solves some problems of symbolic execution in handling loops and array. Our approach
is an extension of it. Our model starts by converting all the constraints along a suspicious
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path into constraint functions. We define c(x) as a constraint function, which is derived
from the conditional statements. It is formulated as follows: c(x){<, <, =, f}0, where ?
is the set of input variables along the path. Table 7 illustrates how to construct a constraint
function from a conditional statement. The idea behind this is to make constraint function
be relative to zero.
Conditional Statement Desired Branch Constraint Function c(x) Satisfied
Constraint
Value
lhs > rhs True branch rhs — lhs < 0
lhs > rhs False branch lhs — rhs < 0
lhs >= rhs True branch rhs — lhs < 0
lhs >= rhs False branch lhs — rhs < 0
lhs < rhs True branch lhs — rhs < 0
lhs < rhs False branch rhs — lhs < 0
lhs <= rhs True branch lhs — rhs < 0
lhs <= rhs False branch rhs — lhs < 0
lhs rhs True branch lhs — rhs = 0
lhs = rhs False branch lhs — rhs F o
lhs f rhs True branch aòs(lhs — rhs) < 0 or > 0
lhs f rhs False branch a6s(lhs — rhs) = 0
Table 7: Constraint Function Table [70]
Once a problem node is encountered during the test data generation, the subgoal of test
data generation becomes to minimize the constraint function of the problem node so as to
overcome the problem node. To this end, the test data generation can now be viewed as
a minimization problem. Since dynamic analysis has runtime overhead, the minimization
process must be as fast as possible.
By observing the dynamic behavior of the constraint functions, reasonable assumptions
can then be made as what the relation is between c{x) and x. The constraint value is
calculated in reference to zero. For example, consider a program node with the following
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condition: if (? > 12), and where the true branch is part of the suspicious path. Now,
suppose at dynamic time, the initial generated data for ? is 0. The constraint value is
calculated as (12 - x) = 12. Our target is to make this constraint value less than 0, so
that the desired branch is executed. The following attempts would then try to make this
constraint value less than 0. In addition, through the observation, we can estimate whether
the constraint function c(x) is linear or non-linear in order to decide what technique should
be used to generate test data.
Test Data Generation based on Linear Programming
For linear programming, we use the one-dimensional search procedure [53], which consists
of two steps, exploratory search and pattern search, to guide the iteration of test data gener-
ation. In the first step, an exploratory move is used to determinate the direction, in which to
proceed. In this step, one input variable is selected to be increased and decreased by a small
offset, while keeping other variables constant. For each change, we execute the program
and calculate the constraint value of the problem node if the execution fails to follow the
suspicious path. By comparing the values of the input variables and the constraint values,
a direction is decided. Afterwards, the pattern search is started. During this search process,
a large move to the input variable is made and the program is executed. Once the violation
is detected, and the constraint value is moving towards the satisfied value, a larger move is
made in the same direction.
In our implementation, the observation process starts by the execution of three attempts
with an initial guess xk,xk-A and xk + ?, where ? is a small offset. The outcome is used
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to determine which direction we should proceed. If the direction is detected, we adjust the
input and start the execution of the program under test again. The general algorithm for
test data generation for linear functions is illustrated in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Test Data Generation Algorithm based on Linear Programming
Input: instrumented program under test, suspicious path
Output: test data
? <= initial_guess
while a problem node encountered && resource is not exhausted do
//Execute the instrumented program with test data x, and gather the constraint values
c(x) = execute(x)
if suspiciousjpath is reached then
return x;
end if
/*Adjust the test data with a small offset,execute the instrumented program
and gather the constraint values */
c(x + ?) = execute(x + ?)
if suspicious_path is reached then
return x;
end if
/*Adjust the test data with a small offset in another direction,execute the
instrumented program and gather the constraint values */
c(x — ?) = execute(x — ?)
if suspiciousjpath is reached then
return x;
end if
//Exploratory move is used to determine the direction, in which to proceed
direction = calculatejHrection{{x + ?), (x — ?), c(x + ?), c(x + A));
//A large move to the input variable is made
m.ove = calculatejraove(previousjmove, direction);
x = x + move;
end while
Test Data Generation based on Non-linear Programming
If the relationship between the input data x, and the c(x) is non-linear, then Newton-
Raphson method, which is effective in finding a minimum or maximum of a real-valued
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function [33], is utilized. Our interest is to find a value with which the constraint function
will reach beyond the threshold of zero. By attempting quick convergence to a minima, we
do achieve our goal of crossing the threshold quickly.
Given a constraint c(x) and its derivatives c'(x) and c"(x), we begin with a first guess
X0. According to Newton-Raphson method: the approximation X1 is calculated as follows:
c'(x)
X1 = X0 c"(x)
As the details of the constraint function is unknown, instead of computing c and c
exactly, we can use finite difference approximations:
,. . c(x + ?) -c(x- A)c(x)k 2? '-
,,. . c(x + ?) - 2c(x) + c(x - ?)c (x) « —2 —
,where the ? is a small offset. According to Newton-Raphson method, we adjust the test
data as follow:
? c(xk + ?) - c(xfc - ?)
xk+i = Xk- 2 c(xfc + ?) - 2c(xfc) + c(xfc - ?)
The general algorithm for test data generation for non-linear functions is illustrated in
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Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Test Data Generation Algorithm based on Non-linear Programming
Input: instrumented program under test, suspicious path
Output: test data
? <= initial_guess
while problem node encountered && resource is not exhausted do
//Execute the instrumented program with test data x, and gather the constraint values
c(x) = execute(x)
if suspiciousjpath is reached then
return x;
end if
/*Adjust the test data with a small offset, execute the instrumented program
and gather the constraint values*/
c(x + ?) = executeix + ?)
if suspiciousjpath is reached then
return x;
end if
/*Adjust the test data with a small offset in revers direction,
execute the instrumented program and gather the constraint values*/
c(x — ?) = execute(x — ?)
if suspiciousjpath is reached then
return x;
end if
//The test data is adjusted based on Newton-Raphson methodr _ ~ ? c(x+A)-c(x-A) ,
x x 2 c(x+?)-2c(x)+c{x-A),
end while
5.2 Static Analysis Phase
Our approach starts the static analysis phase first to- analyze the GIMPLE representation of
the source code of the program under test. GIMPLE contains the control flow and data flow
information needed for static analysis. We use an XML patch [45] of GCC, which dumps
the GIMPLE of the program under test into XML files. To facilitate the analysis of the
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GIMPLE, we design and implement a set of C++ classes, which has a similar structure to
GIMPLE. Figure 14 shows a fragment of the class diagram. After dumping the XML files,
we parse them with an XML parser written in C++, and then create the object-oriented



































































Figure 14: Partial Class Diagram of GIMPLE
5.2.1 Control Flow Analysis
In this analysis, we classify the branches of each conditional statement along a suspicious
path into two categories: desired and undesired. Any branch that leads the execution away
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from the suspicious path, will be classified as undesired, otherwise as desired. Once the
execution of the program under test hits an undesired branch, it will be halted immediately.
5.2.2 Data Flow Analysis
The following data flow information along a suspicious path are also gathered:
• Input variables along the suspicious path;
• Controlling variables along the suspicious path;
• Dependencies between the input variables and the controlling variables.
The purpose of the data flow analysis is to analyze the dependency between controlling
variables and input variables. The input variables are the variables whose values are needed
to be generated so that to make the execution of the program under test follow the suspi-
cious path. The controlling variables are variables appearing in a conditional statement
along the path.
After the input variables and controlling variables information is gathered, the depen-
dency analysis is conducted. The purpose of this dependency analysis is that: once a
problem node is encountered during test data generation, we just need to adjust the input
variables that affect the constraint function inside that problem node, leaving those unre-
lated input variables unchanged, so as to speed up the test data generation process. For
example, in Figure 15, our interest is to generate test data to reach the ma 11 oc statement.
There are ten input variables along the suspicious path, and the constraint function 10 98-
ctrl_var of the problem node is controlled by the the variable ctrl_var, which is
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dependent on the input variable xlO. As a result, only test data for xlO will be adjusted.
There is no need to generate test data for the rest input variables. Therefore, the number of
iterations is reduced. As a result, the performance of the test data generation is enhanced.
#include <stdio.h>
finclude <stdlib.h>
int main ( ) {
int X~l,x2,x3,x4,x5,x6,x7,x8,x9,xl0;
char »buffer;
scanf ("%d%d%d%d%d%d%d%d%d%d%d", SxI, &x2, &x3, &x4,
&x5,&x6,&x7,&x8,&x9,&xl0);
int ctrl_var = xlO + 123;
if (ctrl_var > 1098) {
buffer = malloc(1024) ;
}else if{xl > 1024 && x2 < -897 && x3 == 12345) {
(else if(x4 == 789 && x5 > 5324 && x6 < -97) {




Figure 15: Data Flow Analysis Sample
A controlling variable is dependent on an input variable if and only if:
1 . The controlling variable itself is the input variable;
2. The constraint function is the use of the input variable.
The static analysis aims to improve the efficiency of the dynamic analysis that is costly
in terms of runtime overhead. The enhancements are as follows: first, only test data of
the related input variables will be generated, which results in less number of iterations.
Second, once the execution of instrumented program under test hits a undesired branch, the
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execution is halted.
5.3 Dynamic Analysis Phase
In the dynamic analysis phase, dynamic information, such as constraint value, problem
node, and execution history, is collected.-
5.3.1 Monitoring for Test Data Generation
In order to conduct dynamic analysis, the runtime behavior of programs under test needs to
be monitored. The following monitoring functionalities are needed for the purpose of test
data generation:
• Program execution monitoring: our approach is an iterative approach. The test data
generation attempts are adjusted based on the constraint values, which are obtained
by monitoring the runtime value of the constraint functions along the suspicious path.
In addition, once the program execution follows an undesired branch, the monitoring
code should stop the execution immediately and identify the problem node;
• Test data communicating: the test data generation logic is implemented in test data
generation server, which will be detailed in Section 5.4.2. The test data generation
process involves the communication between the program under test and the server.
The test data is generated by the server, and sent to the client, which is the program
under test. At the same time, the client collects dynamic information, such as con-
straint value, execution history, during its execution, and send them to the server. To
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enable the communication between the client and the sever, the test data communi-
cating code fragments need to be injected into the program under test;
• User input abstracting: since our system strives to achieve the maximum automation
possible, we need to abstract program statements that would require user interaction
(i.e., scanf ( ) ). The input abstractor replaces the input statements, so that calls for
data entries are abstracted by other calls that would perform the same functionality
without any user interaction. Currently, our implementation provides an abstraction
to only a limited set of all possible input methodologies, but extensions can be added.
5.3.2 APIs for Monitoring
The calls of the following APIs are instrumented into the program under test for the moni-
toring purpose:
• _initialize () : initializes the monitoring functionalities, such as allocating mem-
ory and creating log files;
• _f inali ? e ( ) : finalizes the monitoring, such as releasing the memory and writing
log files;
• _do_execution_monitoring (int bb_index, const char* funcName)
halts the program once the execution hits a undersized path;
• _calculate_constraint (int lhs, int rhs, int oper, int bb_-
index, const char* funcName) : calculates the constraint value before the
execution of the conditional statement;
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• _abstract_input (const char* format, ... ): extracts the environ-
mental interaction, such as user input statement, and automate the test data input
process;
• _send_msg (char* msg) : sends messages to the server;
• _receive_msg (char* msg) : receives messages from the server. -
5.4 Execution Management
For dynamic analysis, we need to restart the execution of the program under test, once an
attempt fails. At the same time, we need to store the information collected from the static
and dynamic analysis and compute test data based on the collected information. In order
to protect the testing environment, it is better to separate the test data computation and
the execution of the program under test. To achieve this goal, we introduce the execution
manager, which is a TCP/IP socket client-server framework. It has two major components:
instrumented programs under test that serves as a client, and a test data generation server
as illustrated in Figure 16. This design also provides the flexibility to generate test data for
more than one programs at the same time.
5.4.1 Instrumented Program Under Test
An instrumented program under test serves as a client to the test data generation server.
Once a user interaction is needed, it will send a request to the test data generation server, and
use the response as the input. In addition, the client is responsible for collecting dynamic
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information and sending them to the server. On the other hand, the instrumented program
under test is executed under monitoring. During the execution, once it hits an undesired
branch, it will be halted immediately.
5.4.2 Test Data Generation Server
We need a component that can store the information collected from static and dynamic
analysis, perform data analysis, and generate test data. A test data generation server is
introduced for that purpose. The communication between the server and a client is based
on TCP/IP socket. Figure 1 6 illustrates the communication steps involved during test data

















Figure 16: Execution Manager
The communication steps involved are as follows:
• Path request: When the client executes, it needs to know the suspicious path, which
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it should follow. The path request is formatted as follows: program_name:path_-
request;
• Path response: the server will send the path information to the client once it re-
ceives the request. The path has a format that is as follows: path_response:fimction_-
name:bb\, function_name:bb2, ..., function_name:bbn;
• Data request: during the execution, when a user input is needed, user input abstract-
ing function sends data request to the server automatically. The format of the data
request is as follows: data_request:function_name:bbn:variable_name:line_num-,
• Data response: the sever generates test data based on the collected information.
It then sends it to the client. The response is constructed as follows: data_re-
sponse:function_name:bbn:variable_name:line_num:value ;
• Dynamic information feedback: during the execution, the client gathers dynamic in-
formation and sends it to the server. Such dynamic information includes: constraint
values and execution history. To send a constraint value, the following message is
constructed and senV.constraint_value:fiinction_name:bbn:value. The execution his-
tory message has a format as follows: path_response:function_name:bbi,function_-
name:bb2, ¦¦¦, function_name:bbn.
The test data generation is based on the static and dynamic information collected from
the program under test. The test data generation server uses hash tables to store such
information, which are illustrated as follows:
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• Branch Direction Table
• Dependency Table
• Constraint Value Table
• Test Data Generation History Table
Branch Direction Table
Table 8 contains branch directions of every node that has a conditional statement. It is
constructed during static analysis. The left column of the table represents basic blocks and
their branches. The right column shows the classification of the branches. The purpose
of using this table is to identif unnecessary runtime cost. Once the execution of the client












Table 8: Branch Direction Table
Dependency Table
Table 9 illustrates the dependency between input variables and conditional basic blocks
along the suspicious path. It shows which input variables are affecting which basic blocks.
This table is constructed during the static analysis phase. The first column of the table
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contains basic blocks, the second column is a set of input variables, which might affect the
controlling variables in the conditional statement of the basic blocks. This table is used to
optimize the test data generation process. When a problem node is encountered, only the
value of the input variables that have dependency on the problem node will be adjusted for
next attempts, which results in less number of iterations. In addition, this table helps detect
some infeasible paths. If a problem is encountered during the test data generation process
for a suspicious path and the input variable set for the problem node is null, which means
that this basic block is not controlling by any input variables, we say the path is infeasible.
Basic Block Number Input Variable
Obi {xuX2,...,Xn}
bb2 {yi,y2,--,yn}
bbn I Jz1, z2)... ,zn}
Table 9: Controlling Variable Table
Constraint Value Table
The constraint value of a problem node is very important for us to check how far away
the test data is from satisfaction. To make the execution follow the suspicious path, all
constrain value along the path must be a satisfied constraint value as shown in Table 7. If
a constraint value of a node is not satisfied, it means that node is a problem node. This
information is gathered during the dynamic time.
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Table 10: Constraint Value Table
Test Data Generation History Table
The test data generation server keeps track of the test generation history for each input
variable. The next test data generated is based on the last data attempted, and the constraint
value of the problem node. Table 1 1 contains the test attempted for each input variable
along the suspicious path. The first column of this table is the input variable, and the test
data that has been attempted is shown in the second column. Once a successful test data
generation is achieved, the last test data attempt is the satisfied one.
Input Variable Value
X1 val\, val2, ¦¦¦, valn
X2 vali, val2, ---,VaIn
Xn vali, val2, ..., valn
Table 1 1 : Test Data Generation History Table
5.5 System Design
The system design of the hybrid test data generator is illustrated in Figure 17. This gener-
ator contains six components:
• XML-Dump: it is an extended GCC, with which the GIMPLE representation of a


























Figure 17: System Design of Hybrid Test Data Generator
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• XML-Parser: it is an XML parser written in C++, with which object-oriented rep-
resentations for the GIMPLE are constructed from the XML files injected by the
XML-Dump;
• Static Analyzer: it analyzes the GIMPLE representation and gathers control flow and
data flow information along the suspicious path;
• Code Instrumentor: it is an extended GCC that instruments monitoring code into the
program under test;
• Shared Library for Instrumentation: this contains the implementations of the APIs
for monitoring, calls of which are instrumented into the program under test;
• Execution Manager: it is responsible to coordinate the test data generation server and
its client (the instrumented program under test).
Briefly, this approach is an iterative approach. The test data generation process can
be summarized as follows: starts with the XML-Dump, source code of the program under
test is translated into GIMPLE representation in XML format, with which the XML-Parser
constructs object-oriented representation of the GIMPLE. Given the output from XML-
Parser, the static analyzer performs static analysis to collect control flow and data flow
information along a suspicious path. All the static information will be stored in the test
data generation server. On the other hand, the code instrumentor, an extended GCC 4.2,
injects calls of the APIs for monitoring into the program under test during the compilation.
After that, the execution manager executes the instrumented program under test, which
sends dynamic information to the test data generation server and waits for test data from it.
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With the collected dynamic and static information, test data generation server generates test
data, and sends it back to the client. Once the attempt fails, the execution manager restarts
the instrumented program under test and the server will adjust the test data according to the
collected static and dynamic information.
5.6 Summary
In this chapter, we explained the test data generation process that utilizes the synergy be-
tween the static and dynamic analysis. In this approach, we convert the test data generation
problem into a minimization one. We are inspired by Korel's approach. However, our
approach goes beyond Korel's one. The distinctions are as follows:
• This approach is designed for security testing purpose, while Korel's approach is
designed for general purpose of test data generation;
• In our approach, Newton-Raphson method is used to improve the efficiency of test
data generation;
• Code instrumentation is done automatically. We extend the GCC 4.2 to automate the
code instrumentation for test data generation;
• Our approach is a hybrid approach, which utilizes the static analysis to guide the
dynamic analysis;
• We target C language in our research, while Korel is interested in Pascal. Our ap-
proach can be extended to any language that is supported by GCC.
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Chapter 6
Integrated System and Experiments
This chapter introduces the interfaces and functionalities of the integrated system for test
data generation. The experimental results with the integrated system are also presented.
6.1 Integrated System
This section introduces the GUI of our integrated system for test data generation.
6.1.1 System Overview
Figure 18 illustrates the overview of the GUI of the integrated system. The GUI can be
divided into three areas. First, the upper part is a menu bar. By clicking the menu on it,
a user can choose what subsystem to be used. There are three main subsystems listed in
the menu bar, which are SVR, Automatic Test Data Generator (ATDG), and DVD. Second,
a project list is shown in the left panel. For any software under test, we create a project
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for it so that the source code of the software can be imported into the system. Third, the
right panel is a console to display system messages. Any feedback information from the
execution of any task will be displayed in this panel. We mainly discuss the GUI related
with ATDG, which is our implementation for test data generation.








File Tools SVR ATDC DVD Help
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Figure 18: System Overview
6.1.2 System Configuration
Before using the system for test data generation, some system-specific settings for test data
generation must be done. Figure 19 illustrates the configurations to be set at the initial use.
These settings include:
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B System Preferences Dialpg
secgcc Bin Dlrecotry: |home/adrninistrator/workspace/GCC/build-dir/bin¡ Browse—
Shell Script Directory: l/home/administrator/workspace/SriellScripis | Browse..
Project build Driver. [^orkspace/ShellScripls/FrojBuildDoxvOocDriver.shj | Browse..
Doxvgen search DrI... ¡Orkspace/ShatlScripls/DoxyCSrcCodePageFindershl | Browse-,
ATDCGCCCFCXML.. |3G-CCC^DllHF-CFC-XMlfgcc-4.1.0/build-dir./bin| I Browse..
ATDC CCC DIi: [^e/bagjide/worksp^c^/^OC-CC_C4.^/bi^id_/bin] | Browse.-
ATDC Execution Ma... l/workspacj/ATDG-Exectnion-Managemem/Debutil I Browse...
i Ok ?? Cancel
Figure 19: System Configuration
• Location of the shell scripts, which helps invoking the code written in C or C++
commands from Java;
• Location of the XML dumper, which is used for dumping the GIMPLE representation
of the program under test into XML files;
• Location of the extended GCC 4.2 for code instrumentation;
• Location of the execution manager, which launches the test data generation server
and the instrumented executable of a program under test.
6.1.3 Interfaces
Figure 20 shows the main interfaces of ATDG. It contains the following items:
Create Project: imports the source files of the program under test into the system.





Step 1: Dump CFG XML
Step 2: Do Static Analysis
Step 3: Do Code Instrumentation
Step 4: Generate Test Data
Step 5: View Test Data Generation Report
Figure 20: System Menu
• Dump CFG XML: generates GIMPLE representation in XML format;
• Do Static Analysis: conducts static analysis over the program under test;
• Do Code Instrumentation: instruments the calls of the APIs for monitoring into the
program under test;
• Generate Test Data : executes the instrumented program under test to generate the
test data;
• View Test Data Generation Report: displays the generated test data report.
6.1.4 Test Data Generation
Once the code instrumentation is done, as illustrated in Figure 21, a user can execute the
instrumented executable by selecting the executable file and defining the suspicious path.
Given an instrumented executable, and a suspicious path, the test data generation process
is initialized.
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Command- line Opti... |_
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Figure 21 : Test Data Generation Dialog
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Int TestDataGenerationServer::handleMininiizationlnfoi char "info.)
TestDataCenerationServer.:handleMinimizationlnfo:Value: INFO:MINIMIZATIOh
TestDataCenerationSer\'er::handlel«linimizationlnfo: Found the Minimization
TestDataGenerationServer:handleMinimlzationlnfo: A Minimization record is t
TestDataCenerationServer::activateSocketO: Receive the msg: INFO:MINIMIZÄ
int Te5tDataCKnerationSen/er::handleMinirnizationlnfoKhar*info')
TestDataCenerationSeiver::handlel,1inimizationlnTo:Value: INFOMINIMIZATIOI
TestDataGeneraiionServer::hancIleMinimizationlnio: Found the Minimizatiost: :
ATDC-lnstrumentLirj:atclçi_do_scanf
atda.do.scanf
SockeiClient::sendRec]uest: Sending msg: REQUEST:INPUT:main:2:.x9.
ATDC-lnstrumentLilj:atdçj. do.scant
atda.do.scanf
SocketClient::sendRequest: Sending msg: REQUEST:INFUT:main:2:x:10.
ill
Figure 22: Test Data Generation
82
Figure 22 illustrates the dynamic analysis process for generating the test data for the
suspicious path.
6.1.5 Test Data Generation Report
When the test generation is successfully done, a test data generation report will be gener-
ated as a HTML file. Figure 23 shows a sample of test data generation report. The report
contains path information, test data generation history, and statist information, such as the
time used.
! (S; file:///home/b... estReport.html X |
Test Data Generation Report
Path:
main:0 main:l main:2 main:3 main:4 main:S main:6 main:7 main:8 main:9 main:13
Test data generation history inside the function: main
¡variable Name: xlO [Oj
[variable Mame: xll ¡0
¡Variable Name: xl [OfT PT |-171 ¡174 I
Variable Name: x2 S
¡Variable Name: x3 [0[G;?G ¡-362 ¡365 |
¡Variable Name: x4 ¡0
Done
Figure 23: Test Data Generation Report
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6.2 Experiments
The experiments emphasize the aim of applying our framework to test suites of programs.
6.2.1 Environment
All experiments were run on a core-2 PC with a clock frequency of 2.0 GHZ, 2 MB of level
II cache, and 2G RAM under the following environments:
• Operating system: Ubuntu Linux release 6.10
• CIC++: GCC 4.2
• Java runtime environment: Java(TM) SE Runtime Environment (build 1 .6.0 02b05)
• Moped: Moped version 2
6.2.2 Validated Security Properties
During the experiments, we define a set of security properties to be validated.
1 . RACE-CONDITION: Time-of-check-to-time-of-use (TOCTOU) vulnerabilities are
due to the fact that there is a period of time between the checking of a condition and
the use of the results of that check. This period of time allows either an attacker
to intentionally or another interleaved process or thread to unintentionally change
the state of the targeted resource and yield unexpected and undesired results [65].
TOCTOU vulnerabilities are usually a kind of race condition. To prevent TOCTOU
race conditions that might be exploited by an attacker to substitute the file between
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the check (e.g., stat or access call) and the use (open call), a program should
not pass the same file name to two system calls on any path. Figure 24 shows the
automaton that represents the security property RACE-CONDITION.
CHECKX USE(X
ErrarStartStart
_CHECK(X) = access, stat, statfs, statvfs, lstat, readlink,
tempnam, tmpnam, tmpnam_r
_USE(X) = acct, au_to_path, basename, catopen, chdir,
chmod, chown, chrrot, copyl'ist, creat, dbjnitalize, dbm_open,
dbminit, dirname, dlopen, execl, execle, execlp, execv,
execve, execvp, fattach, fdetach, fopen, freopen, ftok, ftw,
getattr, krb_recvauth, krb_set_tkt_string, kvm_open, Ichown,
link, mkdir, mkdirp, mknod, mount, nftw, nisgetservlist,
nis_mkdir, nis_ping, nis_rmdi, nlist, open, opendir, patchconf,
pathfind, realpath, remove, rename, rmdir, rmdirp, scandir,
symlink, system, t_open, truncate, umount, unlink, utime,
utimes, utmpname
Figure 24: RACE-CONDITION Automaton
2. CHROOT-JAIL: the chroot ( ) function establishes a virtual root directory for the
owning process. The main purpose of chroot ( ) is to confine a user process to a
portion of the file system so as to prevent unauthorized access to system resources.
Programs like ftp and httpd commonly make use of this function. The ch-
root (') function requires root (super-user) access to call. If the programmer contin-
ues to run as root after the chroot ( ) call, he or she opens up a potential vulnerabil-
ity window for an attacker to use elevated privilege. Another problem of chroot ( )
is that it changes the root directory but not the current directory. Therefore, program
can escape from changed root if it forgets calling chdir ("/"). Figure 25 shows
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Figure 25: CHROOT-JAIL Automaton
3. MEMORY-MANAGEMENT: in this security property, we define four states: start,
allocated, deallocated, and error. When a memory pointer is created,
the state of the pointer will be updated as start. Once the pointer is assigned
to a memory location, the state will be transited to allocated from start. If
the pointer is released, the state will be transited from allocated to deallo-
cated. Any transition leads to the error state represents a violation of the secu-
rity property. Figure 26 shows the automaton that represents the security property
MEMORY-MANAGEMENT. This automaton is capable of catching the following
errors:
• Memory leak: this error occurs when a program fails to release memory when
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no longer needed. In the automaton, assigning a memory location to an unini-
tialized pointer will transit the state of the pointer from start to state allo-
cated. The exit of the program without freeing the pointer will then transit
the state into the error state, which indicates a memory leak error is caught;
• Double free: this error will be triggered when the release operation is applied
more than once on the same memory address. In the automaton, once the
pointer is in the deallocated state, any release operation on that pointer
will trigger the double free error;
• Using uninitialized memory: it means the use of the pointer that has not been
allocated a memory address yet. In the automaton, if the current state is start,
any read or write operation will trigger this error. In addition, any read or write







Figure 26: MEMORY-MANAGEMENT Automaton
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4. STRCPY: it is drawn from the coding rule STRCPY of CERT [65]. The string copy
library functions are vulnerable to buffer overflow attacks. The strcpy (dest,
s re ) function is the classic one that is vulnerable to buffer overflow attacks. To use
this function properly, the destination buffer must be big enough to hold the source
string plus the null terminating character. Otherwise, it gives the attacker an op-
portunity to send input larger than the buffer size, which results in overflowing the
buffer. This can be exploited by an attacker to implement a denial of service (DoS)
or buffer overflow attack [65]. SVR is not able to detect buffer overflow vulnerabil-
ities like this, since string length comparison and string content checking can only
be conducted dynamically. However, SVR can report suspicious paths where the
vulnerable function strcpy is used. A buffer-overflow security can be classified as
non-reachability property. To reduce it to a reachability one, additional constraints
should be added. In this case, to prove the exist of the violation, additional constraint
{strlen (src) >= Strien (dest) } or {dest [n-1 ] F '\0'} is added as ad-
ditional constraint to the constraint set along the suspicious path. Then, test data gen-
eration is used to verify whether or not a violation of buffer-overflow exists. Once the
test data, which satisfies the constraints along the path as well as {strlen (src)
>= strlen (dest) } or {dest [n-1] f '\0'}, is generated, we prove that the
violation is positive. Figure 27 shows the automaton that represents the security
property STRCPY.
5. TEMPNAM-TMPFILE:
very often, software applications use temporary files for information sharing, and
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other other
deslln-1]=\0strten(src) < strlen(dest)strcpyidest. src)
StateZ State3StatelStart
desUn-1) != ?0strlen(src) >= strlen(dest)
Error
Figure 27: STRCPY Automaton
temporary data storing. However, many applications use the temporary files in a
loose way: terminating execution without cleaning these temporary files, which gives
attackers a chance to hijack private and sensitive data. Therefore, the temporarily
files must be used with caution. The standard C library provides a set of functions
for temporary files creation. However, some of these functions are vulnerable to
various forms of attacks and must be used with precaution. This security property
is drawn based on the coding rule TEMPNAM-TMPFILE from CERT [65]. This
security property focus on two aspects, temporary file creation and permissions man-
agement. Temporary file names created by the tmpnam family of functions such
as tmpnam ( ) , tempnam ( ) , tmpf ile ( ) , and mktemp ( ) can be easily guessed
by an attacker. Incorrect temporary file creation can lead to TOCTOU and accessi-
bility vulnerabilities [65]. As a result, these functions should not be used. On the
other hand, as a temporary file is usually created in a shared folder, the appropriate
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permissions should be set to these files so to ensure the protection against attackers.
As such, a call to urna s k ( 07 7 ) must be done before a call to mkstemp to make
sure that only the owner can access these temporary file. With considering these two







/TEMPFlLE= {tmpnam, tempnam. mktemp, tmpfile, mkstemp}
_USE= {chown. chmode, link, rename, creat, open, symlink, ulink, stat}
Figure 28: TEMPNAM-TMPFILE Automaton
6.2.3 Programs Under Test
We conduct the experiments on a suite of C programs, which contain violations of the
above-mentioned security properties. This suit contains the following five programs under
test:
1. Program 1: this program has a RACE-CONDITION vulnerability, which is trig-
gered when the program calls a check function: access followed by a use function:
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open;
2. Program 2: this program contains a violation of CHROOT-JAIL security property.
The program has a vulnerable path, where the chroot is used in a incorrect way;
3. Program 3: this program has a MEMORY-MANAGEMENT vulnerability. Memory
leak occurs when the execution terminates without releasing allocated memory;
4. Program 4: this program is vulnerable to buffer-overflow attack. It violates the secu-
rity property STRCPY;
5. Program 5: this program manages temporarily files using vulnerable functions. It
has a violation of TEMPNAM-TMPFILE security property.
The details of the programs under test are listed in Appendix B.
6.2.4 Results
Given the security properties, SVR detected the following set of suspicious paths from the
five programs under test:
• Program 1 : tested against the security property RACE-CONDITION, and a suspi-
cious path is detected as follow: (main : O) (main : 1) (main : 2) (main :
3) (main : 5) (main : 13) (main : 14) (main : 15) (main : 16) (main : 17);
• Program 2: tested against the security property CHROOT-JAIL, and a suspicious
path is detected as follow: (main : O) (main : 1) (main : 2) (main : 3) (main :

























Table 12: Experimental Results using Random Testing
• Program 3: tested against the security property MEMORY-MANAGEMENT, and a
suspicious path is detected as follow: (main : 0) (main : 1) (main : 2) (main :
3) (main : 4) (main : 5) (main : 6) (main : 7) (main : 8) (main : 9) (main : 13);
• Program 4: tested against the security STRCPY, and a suspicious path is detected
as follow: (main : 0) (main : 1) (main : 2) (main : 3) (main : 4) (main :
5) (main : 6) (main : 8) (main : 9) (main : 10) (main : 11) (main : 12) (main :
23);
• Program 5: tested against the security TEMPNAM-TMPFILE, and a suspicious path
is detected as follow: (main : 0) (main : 1) (main : 2) (main : 3) (main :
4) (main : 5) (main : 6) (main : 8) (main : 9) (main : 10) (main : 11) (main :
12) (mam : 13) (mam : 14) (mam : 15) (mam : 16) (main : 17) (mam :
18) (main : 19) (main : 20) (mam : 21) (main : 22) (main : 25).
In order to verify the existence of the vulnerabilities, test data generation is performed.
For test data generation, four different approaches are utilized: random testing, Moped
reachability checker without program slicing, Moped reachability checker with program
slicing, and the hybrid approach. The experimental results are shown in Tables 12, 13, 14.
Two measurements were used to evaluate the performance of the different approaches: the
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Program 1 RACE-CONDITION 5580 250 96%




Program 4 STRCPY 370 190 49%
Program 5 TEMPNAM-TMPFILE 80 70 12.5%
Table 13: Experimental Results using Moped Reachability Checker
total time used for the whole test data generation process, and the number of iterations,
which means how many times the program under test is executed (not applicable to Moped
reachability checker).
As shown in Table 12, in a total of five programs under test, random testing approach
is able to generate test data. However, the time consumed for each case varies dramati-
cally. The result shows that the performance of random approach for test data generation
is unstable. The time for test data generation is unpredictable. Whenever there is an "equal
to" condition along the suspicious path, the performance of random testing decreases a lot.
Theoretically, the random approach is able to generate test data for any feasible suspicious
path since it is a matter of time. However, in reality, time matters.
Table 1 3 shows the experiment results of test data generation based on Moped reach-
ability checker without and with program slicing. For small size programs, these two ap-
proaches can generate test data very quickly. The experimental results also show that the
program slicing improves the efficiency of test data generation. However, this approach
(Moped reachability checker with program slicing) has drawbacks. First, its performance
is limited by state space. As the state space goes up, the performance drops down. Second,
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Program name Security property Time (millisecond) Iterations
Program 1 RACE-CONDITION 1413 13
Program 2 CHROOT-JAIL 1493 13
Program 3 MEMORY-MANAGEMENT 5757 12
Program 4 STRCPY 140800 37
Program 5 TEMPNAM-TMPFILE 502532 121
Table 14: Experimental Results using the Hybrid Approach
as the complexity (such as the number of the variables, number of sub components) of the
program under test increases, the performance decreases dramatically. Third, the enhance-
ment of program slicing is affected by the program under test itself. Once the code along
a suspicious path has high-level of coupling with other code in the program, the improve-
ment through program slicing is not obvious. As a result, this approach is not suitable for
large size software, which usually have complex function calls and high level of coupling.
Therefore, we suggest it to be used for embedded safety-critical software that usually has
a relatively small size.
The experimental result Table 14 shows that the hybrid approach is a stable one. It can
generate test data in a reasonable time. The number of iterations and the time used depend
on factors like number of constraints of a suspicious path, the execution time of the program
under test, the number of code instrumented, and the relationship (linear or non-linear)
between input variables and control variables. Usually, linear programming takes more
time than non-linear one. Different from Moped reachability checker, the performance of
this approach is not affected by the state space. In addition, the time consumed increases
in linear rather than exponential way as the number of constrains grows.
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The test data generation experimental results show that random testing has the low-
est efficiency in generating test data. Test data generation based on Moped reachability
checker suffers from the state space explosion problem, which limits it to be used for small
size safety-critical software. Among these three different approaches, hybrid is the most
promising approach for test data generation. All the test data generation results prove
that all the vulnerabilities detected by SVR are not false-positives. The overall experience
shows that the system works as envisioned. Experiments clearly indicate that the system





This chapter concludes our thesis. First, we summarize our contributions, then we describe
the future as an extension to our work.
The goal of our research is to automate the process of vulnerability detection so that it
can be conducted in a systematic way: from security property specification to potential vul-
nerability spotting and verification. The aim of the automation is to improve the efficiency
and accuracy of the security vulnerability detection.
In this thesis, we described a framework which utilizes the synergy between the static
and dynamic analysis for vulnerability detection. The basic idea of this framework is to
use static analysis to point out the potential vulnerabilities and verify them with dynamic
analysis. To link the static analysis and dynamic analysis, test data generation is conducted
to generate test cases, which will make the execution of the program under test to reach a
vulnerable site following a suspicious path. With test cases generated, dynamic analysis
can be performed to verify the vulnerabilities detected. Inside this framework, security
96
properties are specified by security automata, which can describe a wide range of security
properties. This framework spots potential vulnerabilities by using Moped model-checker
with automatically generated models, which are synchronized with the security automata.
The test data generation is done through two different approaches: Moped with program
slicing approach and hybrid approach. Moped with program slicing approach is suitable for
small size software with security concern, such as embedded software. Hybrid approach
is more suitable for complex softwares. In addition, we discussed how to extend GCC 4.2
for code instrumentation. Our framework has some appealing properties that we describe
hereafter:
1 . Modular design: the major components of our framework, such as the potential vul-
nerability detection, test case generation, and dynamic verification, are designed as
modules. This design leaves space for future upgrade. For example, if there is a
better technique to spot potential vulnerability, our potential vulnerability detection
component can be replaced without affecting the other parts of the framework.
2. Automation: inside this framework, the process of potential vulnerability detection
is automated as well as the test data generation and dynamic verification. In addition,
the code instrumentation is done during compilation without user interaction.
3. Flexibility: our framework is based on GIMPLE representation, which is language-
independent. Hence, our framework can be extended to support multiple program-
ming languages that are supported by GCC.
4. False positive reduction: our framework reduces the number of false positives by
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generating test data to dynamically assess vulnerabilities.
We also introduced the idea of reducing security vulnerability detection to reachability.
For most cases, reachability is enough to prove the violation of a security property. How-
ever, for a few cases, such as buffer-overflow, only providing reachability to vulnerable site
is not sufficient. Therefore, we proposed the concept of injecting additional constraint to
the program under test to make sure that the test data generated will trigger the violation
of the security property under concern. By applying this concept, we reduce the security
vulnerability detection into reachability.
So far, our system has built up a preliminary infrastructure for security vulnerability de-
tection with number of false positives reduced. We used our tool to detect security vulner-
ability in a set of C programs which contain different vulnerable code. The vulnerabilities
detected are verified as positives. Our experiments validated our design.
In order to achieve the goal of full automation, the following issues need to be ad-
dressed:
1. Support more data types: other types of inputs should be considered, such as string
and float;
2. Support more languages: the current implementation focuses on C code. We need to
extend our approach to support more programming languages;
3. Improve the data flow analysis: for precise data flow analysis, pointer alias analysis
should also be included;
98
4. Improve the efficiency of test data generation by incorporating quasi-Newton meth-
ods into the hybrid approach.
Ultimately, this security testing framework is meant to be coupled with a systematic
security hardening component of free and open source software. By doing so, we will have
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This appendix lists a sample C code, its corresponding GIMPLE representation and control
flow graph as well as two samples of Remopla code.
A.l C Code
Listing A. 1 : Sample Source Code
#include <stdio.h>
int main () {
int array [123], xl;
scanf ("%d",&xl) ;
if(xl > 0 && xl < 123) {
int i = 0;









Listing A.2: Sample GIMPLE Representation
; ; . Function main (main)




int ? 1 ;
int array [123] ;
int D . 1 7 8 8 ;
int xl . 3;
int i . 2 ;
int xl . 1 ;
int xl. 0;
# BLOCK 0
# PRED: ENTRY (fallthru)
scanf (&"%d"[0], SxI);
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xl. O = xl;
if (xl.O <= O) goto <L5>; else goto <L0>;
# SUCC: 6 (true) 1 (false)
# BLOCK 1
# PRED: 0 (false)
<L0>: ;
xl.l = xl;
if (xl.l > 122) goto <L5>; else goto <L1>;
# SUCC: 6 (true) 2 (false)
# BLOCK 2




goto <bb 4> (<L3>) ;
# SUCC: 4 (fallthru)
# BLOCK 3
# PRED: 4 (true)
<L2>: ;
i . 2 = i ;
array[i.2] = i;
i = i + 1;
# SUCC: 4 (fallthru)
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# BLOCK 4
# PRED: 2 (fallthru) 3 (fallthru)
<L3>:;
xl . 3 = xl;
if (i < xl.3) goto <L2>; else goto <L4>;
# SUCC: 3 (true) 5 (false)
# BLOCK 5
# PRED: 4 (false)
<L4>:;
goto <bb 7> (<L6>) ;
# SUCC: 7 (fallthru)
# BLOCK 6
# PRED: 0 (true) 1 (true)
<L5>: ;
__builtin_puts (&"out of boundary" [0] ) ;
# SUCC: 7 (fallthru)
# BLOCK 7
# PRED: 5 (fallthru) 6 (fallthru)
<L6>: ;














Figure 29: Control Flow Graph of the Sample Code
A.4 Remopla Representation







int ?, xl, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6;
if
: : xl > 1000 ->
if
: : x2 > 1000 ->
vfork ( ) ;
: eise -> break;
fi;
: : else ->
if
:: x3 > 1000 -> targetl: x=20;
: : eise ->
if
: : x4 > 1000 -> target2: x=30;
: : eise ->
if
: : x5 > 1000 -> target3: x=40;
: : eise ->
if
: : x6 > 1000 -> target4: x=50;
















module void main O {
int ? 1 , ? 2 ;
if
: : xl > 1000 ->
if
: : x2 > 1000 ->










This appendix lists the programs under test and their CFG
B.l Program 1




int main ( ) {
int Xl,x2,x3,x4,x5,x6,x7,x8,x9,xl0;
char filename []="thef ile. txt";
scanf ("%d%d%d%d%d%d%d%d%d", SxI, &x2, &x3, &x4, &x5, &x6, &x7, &x8, &x9) ;
xl = xl + 104;
x2 = x2 - 58 7;
x3 = ll*x3;
x4 = x4/12;
x7 = (x7 + 104)*11/12 - 587;
xlO = 1Ö23;
if(xl > 100 && x2 < 200 && x3 >= 300 ){
if (0 != access (filename, 02) ) exit(0);
}else if(x7 > 700 && x8 > 800 &&x9 > 900) {
//Examples of Corrected Code
char filename[]="thefile.txt";
if (0 != seteuid(1200) ) { /* handle error */ }
if (0 != setegid(1200) ) { /* handle error-*/ }
if (0 != setgroups(0, 0)) { /* handle error */ }
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FILE *theFile = fopen (filename, "w+");
}else if (xlO == 1024) {
//in feasible path
if (0 == access (filename, 02) ) {
FILE *theFile = fopen (filename, "w+");
}
}
if(x4 <= 400 && x5 != 500 && x6 == 600) {





Figure 30: CFG of Program 1
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B.2 Program 2




//CHROOT-JAIL security property violation
int main ( ) {
int Xl,x2,x3,x4,x5,x6,x7,x8,x9,xl0,xll,xl2;
scanf ("%d%d%d%d%d%d%d%d%d%d%d%d",
SxI, Sx2,Sx3,Sx4,Sx5,Sx6,Sx7,Sx8,Sx9, SxIO, SxIl, Sxl2);
x2 = x2*x2 - 1000*x2 + 100;
x7 =.x7*x7 - 2000*x7 + 200;
xl2 = 4321;
if(xl > 123 SS x2 < -50735 SS x3 >= 5773 SS
x4 <= 7834 SS x5 == 5527 SS x6 != 2778) {
//vulnerable code





}else if(x7 == 2711 SS x8 == 8439 SS x9 < -2874
SS xlO == 483 SS xll == 999) {
//correct way of calling chroot.
gid_t egid = getegidO;
uid_t euid = geteuidf);
char path [ ] = "/usr/sandbox";




}.else if (xl2 != 4321) {
char path[] = "/usr/sandbox";
chroot (path) ;
chdir (". .") ;
chroot (".");




Listing B.3: Program Under Test 3
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
/* This is the demostration of the violation of
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Figure 31: CFG of Program 2
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the MEMEORY-MANAGMENT security property */





Sx9, SxIO, SxIl) ;
XlO = 123456;
int i ;
if(xl > 173 SS x2 < -257 SS x3 >= 365
SS x4 <=469 SS x5 ==535 SS x6 != 626
SS x7 > 789 SS x8 > 888 SS x9 > 975 ) {
buffer = malloc(1024) ;










Listing B.4: Program Under Test 4
# include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
/* This is the demonstration of the violation of
the STRCPY security property */
int main ( ) {
int xl, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7, x8, x9,xl0, xll, xl2, xl3, xl4, xl5,
xl6,xl7, Xl8,xl9,x2 0,x21,x22,x2 3,x24,x25,x2 6,x27,x2 8,
X2 9,x30,x31,x32,x33,x34,x35, x3 6, x37, x38, x3 9, x4 0;
char * buffer;
char src [ ] ="abcdefghi jklmnopqrstuvwxyz" ;
scanf ( "%d%d%d%d%d%d%d%d%d%d%d%d%d%d%d%d%d%d%d%d%d%d%d%d%d%




if(xl > 5 SS x2 < 200 SS x3 <= 300 SS x4 >= 350 SS x5 != 400
SS x6 == 5678 SS x7 == 87 SS x8 == 399 SS x9 == 855
SS xlO == 876 SS xll == 234 SS xl2 == 289) {
char dest [xl ] ;
strcpy (dest, src) ;
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Figure 32: CFG of Program 3
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}else if(xl3 > 100 && xl4 == 111 && xl5 == 22 &&
&& xl7 == 44 && xl8 == 55 && xl9 == 66 && x20
&& x21 == 88) {
const int BUFFER_SIZE = 10;
char stri [BUFFER_SI ZE] ;
char str2 [] ="abcdefghi jklmn";
strncpy (stri, str2, BUFFER_SIZE-1) ;
/* guarantee result will be null terminated *




























Listing B.5: Program Under Test 5
//TMPNAM-TMPFILE security property demonstration
int main ( ) {
char *filePath;
int Xl,x2,x3,x4,x5,x6,x7,x8,x9,xl0,xll,xl2,xl3,xl4,xl5,xl6,xl7,xl8,
xl 9, x20, x21,x22, x23,x2 4, x25, x2"6, x27, x2 8, x29, x30, x31,x32,x33,
x34,x35,x3 6,x37, x38,x3 9,x4 0;
scanf ("%d%d%d%d%d%d%d%d%d%d%d%d%d%d%d%d%d%d%d%d%d%d%d%d%d%d%dld%d%d%d%\
d%d%d%d%d%d%d%d%d",Sxl, &x2, Sx3, sx4, Sx5, &x6, Sx7, Sx8, Sx9, SxIO, SxIl,
&xl2,Sxl3, SxI 4, Sxl5,Sxl6,Sxl7,Sxl8,Sxl9,Sx2 0,Sx21,Sx22,Sx23,Sx24,
Sx25,&x26,Sx27,Sx2 8,Sx2 9,Sx30,Sx31,Sx32,Sx33,Sx34,&x35,Sx36,Sx37,
Sx38, Sx39, &x40) ;
if(xl > 1 SS x2 > 2 SS x3 > 3 SS x4 >' 4 SS x5 > 5 SS x6 > 6 SS x7 > 7
SS x8 > 8 SS x9 > 9 SS xlO > 10 SS xll > 11 SS xl2 > 12 SS xl3 < -13
SS xl4 < -14 SS xl5 < -15 SS xl6 < -16 SS xl7 < -17 SS xl8 == 18
SS xl9 == 19 SS x20 == 20 SS x21 == 21 SS x22 == 1023) {
filePath = tmpnam (NULL) ;
(else if (xl < 1) {
//Examples of Corrected Code
mode_t old_umask;
char template!] = "/tmp/f ileXXXXXX" ;
int fd;
old_umask = umask (077);





Figure 34: CFG of Program 5
128
